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ABSTRACT

DECOLONIZING PSYCHIC SPACE:
REMEMBERING THE INDIGENOUS PSYCHOLOGY MOVEMENT IN TAIWAN

By
Rong-Bang Peng
December 2012

Dissertation supervised by Michael Sipiora, Ph.D.
This project is part of the historical struggle of the indigenous psychology
movement in Taiwan.

It turns a critical gaze back upon the movement itself in order to

decolonize it from colonial cultural imaginary. The contribution of this project is
two-fold.

First, on the theoretical level, it introduces a critical perspective into the

growing body of indigenous psychological research.

The indigenous psychology

movement risks repeating the vicious cycle of colonization and re-colonization without
critically looking back at its own historical trajectory.

Second, on the level of

intervention, writing the history of the indigenous psychology movement will make this
project a crucial first step toward relieving Taiwanese psychologists from the cultural
aphasia resulting from the traumatic encounter between two worlds.
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Chapter 1
Indigenous Psychology: The Conjunction of Two Wor(l)ds
In more ingenuous times, when the tyrant razed cities for his own greater
glory, when the slave chained to the conqueror's chariot was dragged
through the rejoicing streets, when enemies were thrown to the wild beasts
in front of the assembled people, the mind did not reel before such
unabashed crimes, and the judgment remained unclouded. But slave
camps under the flag of freedom, massacres justified by philanthropy or
by a taste for the superhuman, in one sense cripple judgment. On the day
when crime dons the apparel of innocence — through a curious
transposition peculiar to our times — it is innocence that is called upon to
justify itself. (Camus, 1991, pp. 3-4)
Kuo-Shu Yang, the founder of the indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan,
begins the story of his profound intellectual and professional transformation from a
Westernized psychologist to an indigenous psychologist by revealing to readers his dream,
the dream for a genuinely ―indigenous psychology‖ in Chinese societies:
I have had a professional dream for about twenty years—to turn the
unhealthily Westernized psychology in Chinese societies into a genuinely
indigenous Chinese psychology. (Yang, 1997, p. 63)
The rhetoric of relating one‘s dream to the collective destiny of the people to which one
belongs easily reminds readers of the historic ―I have a dream‖ speech delivered by Dr.
Martin Luther King Jr. in 1963 in front of the Lincoln Memorial, in which he called for
the nation to rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed: ―We hold these truths to
be self-evident, that all men are created equal.‖ Indeed, Yang‘s story does bear
resemblance to Dr. King‘s speech.

However, the resemblance is more than in rhetoric;

it is in the humbleness of their dreams as well as in the great agony involved to realize
them.

1

What started as one man‘s dream eventually culminated in an academic
movement.

Over the past 30 years, the indigenous psychology movement advocated by

Yang has become an undeniable phenomenon in Taiwan.

More than half a dozen

conferences directly related to or inspired by the movement have been organized since
the inception of the movement in the mid-1970s.

Advocates and interested scholars

have published more than 200 papers, most of them written in Chinese; nevertheless,
English-written papers seem to be growing in numbers in recent years (Hwang, 2004).
A Chinese semiannual journal entitled Indigenous Psychological Research in Chinese
Societies was created to provide a forum for indigenous psychological research in 1993;
in the same year, the Laboratory of Research for Indigenous Psychology was established
in the Department of Psychology at the National Taiwan University (NTU) to hold
seminars for researchers to share their thoughts and works (Hwang, 2005a). In 1997,
the Foundation for the Advancement of Indigenous Psychology in Chinese Societies was
established to provide organizational support for indigenous psychological research.

In

2000, a four-year, nationally funded project of Chinese indigenous psychological
research was launched as a part of a multi-million dollar governmental program, and
some of the results became a special issue (volume 22) of the journal of Indigenous
Psychological Research in Chinese Societies in 2004.

All told, more than two

generations of Taiwanese psychologists have been either mobilized to participate in the
movement or at least influenced or troubled by it (Gabrenya, Kung, & Chen, 2006).

In

his article about the historical development of social psychology in Taiwan, Hei-Yuan
Chiu (2004), a prominent Taiwanese sociologist with a background in psychology,

2

comments that indigenous psychological research has, since the 1990s, become ―the most
important trend‖ within social psychological research in Taiwan (p. 210).
The call for an indigenous psychology is not a phenomenon peculiar to Taiwan; in
fact, starting from the mid-1970s psychologists in other parts of the world such as India
(Nandy, 1974), Mexico (Díaz-Guerrero, 1977), the Philippines (Enriquez, 1977), Japan
(Azuma, 1984), and Korea (Kim, 1990) also advocate their own versions of indigenous
psychologies.

Indian psychologist Durganand Sinha nicely summarizes that indigenous

psychology ―has developed as a reaction to or rejection of dominance of Western
psychology…and has assumed almost the shape of a ‗movement‘ in many erstwhile
colonial and developing countries‖ (Sinha, 1997, p. 135).

Despite the fact that

indigenous psychologies were gaining ground in various Asian societies and the Muslim
world, the marginal voices of indigenous psychologies flew mostly under the radar of
mainstream American psychology in the 1970s and the 1980s (Turtle, 1989). The year
1993 was a landmark for indigenous psychologies—under the editorship of Uichol Kim
and John W. Berry, the first anthology of indigenous psychologies, entitled Indigenous
psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context, was published.

Toward the

end of the 1990s, as the related discussions became more heated, several special issues
were organized by interested scholars and published in peer-reviewed journals such as
Asian Journal of Social Psychology (1998/2000/2005), Applied Psychology: An
International Review (1999), and the International Journal of Psychology (2006). In
2006, under the editorship of Uichol Kim, Kuo-Shu Yang, and Kwang-Kuo Hwang,
another anthology of indigenous psychologies, entitled Indigenous and cultural
psychology: Understanding people in context, was published.
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The emergence of

indigenous psychologies has become, as Carl Martin Allwood and John W. Berry
comment, an ―interesting new phenomenon‖ in psychology (Allwood & Berry, 2006b).
It has taken nearly three decades for indigenous psychologies to be finally
recognized as an ―interesting new phenomenon,‖ as something worthy of attention.

I

will argue, however, that this recent recognition—a seemingly victorious moment for the
indigenous psychology movement—is at the same time misrecognition.

And, as I will

strive to demonstrate, this (mis)recognition of indigenous psychologies, if properly
analyzed, can serve as the entry point to really unpack the phenomenon of indigenous
psychologies in its complexity.

The Recognition/Misrecognition of Indigenous Psychology1
The Negro is a slave who has been allowed to assume the attitude of a
master. The white man is a master who has allowed his slaves to eat at
his table. (Fanon, 1952/1967, p. 219)
The emergence of indigenous psychologies is often misrecognized as the
emergence of a new approach in psychology.

As a so-called ―culture-related‖ approach,

it is often compared to the other two culture-related approaches, namely, cross-cultural
psychology and cultural psychology.

Since most psychologists are more or less familiar

with the two established culture-related psychologies, it is quite intuitive to compare this
new phenomenon with the old ones.

―Culture,‖ however it is defined, seems to be the

main concern for the three of them.

When Harry C. Triandis, an American psychologist

1

As I have alluded to in the following quote, the notion of ―recognition/misrecognition‖ is inspired by
Frantz Fanon‘s classical work on colonial subjectivity Black Skin, White Masks (1952/1967); however, as
Fanon pointed out in the lengthy footnote (fn. 25, pp. 161-164), the theoretical formulation of the role of
the imago in the formation of the subject should be credited to Lacan‘s (2006) conception of the mirror
stage.
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and the chief editor of the first edition of the Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology
(1980), was invited to be a keynote speaker, representing the cross-cultural perspective at
the Third Conference of the Asian Association of Social Psychology (AASP) in 1999, he
as well as the other five keynote speakers2 were asked by the conference organizer ―to
focus and to share their views on how these three different perspectives can be
consolidated‖ (Hwang & Yang, 2000, p. 183). This request makes the conference
papers an interesting and representative anthology with which to begin a discussion of the
recognition/misrecognition of the indigenous psychology movement.
Is indigenous psychology a new approach to psychology? If so, how is it
different from the other two existing culture-related approaches?

And finally, is there a

way to synthesize the three approaches? These are questions Triandis tries to address in
his keynote speech, which was published a year later in the special issue of the Asian
Journal of Social Psychology.
To begin with, indigenous psychology, cultural psychology, and cross-cultural
psychology are taken by Triandis to be ―sub-disciplines‖ or ―approaches‖ of the broad
area that deal with culture and psychology (Triandis, 2000, p. 185). The major
difference among them is that each has its own kind of sampling bias.

As Triandis puts

it,
Indigenous psychologists sample especially the meaning of keywords in
the culture. Cultural psychologists are more likely to sample
ethnographic information and ignore information that comes from
laboratory experiments. They are likely to look for relationships within
the culture. Cross-cultural psychologists are more likely to sample
information across cultures. They are methodologically in-between
2

Six distinguished scholars from three culture-related psychologies were invited as keynote speakers: the
cross-cultural perspective was represented by Harry Triandis and John Berry; the cultural psychological by
Richard Shweder and Patricia Greenfield, and the indigenous psychological by Kuo-Shu Yang and Uichol
Kim (Hwang & Yang, 2000).
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experimental (rigorous control of situations, manipulation of dependent
[sic] variables) and cultural psychologists. (p. 185)
According to Triandis, the methodological difference among the three can be best
illustrated by using the emic-etic distinction.3

Triandis explains the distinction as

follows:
The emic view emphasizes that psychological processes take unique
culture-specific forms; the etic view emphasizes that psychological
processes are basically the same and have different manifestations…. In
short, universals create the basis, and cultural differences are
superimposed. (Triandis, 2000, p. 186)
By adopting the framework of the emic-etic distinction, Triandis perceives ―indigenous
psychology as emphasizing emics, experimental psychology as emphasizing etics, and
cultural and cross-cultural as located in-between, with cultural closer to indigenous, and
cross-cultural closer to experimental psychology‖ (p. 186).

The main advantage of

indigenous psychology is that:
This approach allows a researcher to get to the heart of a culture, by
analyzing the central concepts used very frequently by its members, and
the relationships among these central concepts. One can discover
phenomena that only exist in one culture, and are entirely unknown and
unexpected by researchers from other cultures. (p. 190)
Because Triandis articulates the difference between cultural psychology and indigenous
psychology only in terms of how emic each one is, it is not surprising when he concludes
that ―[to] a large extent the advantages of indigenous psychology are shared by cultural
psychology‖ (p. 191).

Therefore, one can say that there is nothing new about

indigenous psychology except that it tends to be more emic than cultural psychology; it
does not really create any new niche since the advantages are already demonstrated by an

3

The emic-etic distinction is commonly used in anthropology and cross-cultural psychology. The two
terms were first coined by linguistic anthropologist Kenneth Pike (1967) to refer to the distinction between
an insider‘s view (the emic view) and an outsider‘s view (the etic view) of a cultural system.
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existing approach.

In fact, indigenous psychology‘s emic orientation actually becomes

its main disadvantage.

As Triandis says,

It is very difficult to convince mainstream psychologists that they should
pay attention to the findings of this approach. They say: I am interested
in universal psychological phenomena, not in anthropology. Furthermore,
there are potentially too many findings that can be generated by this
approach. It is difficult to convince mainstream psychologists to pay
attention to that many findings. In addition, the richness of findings
raises the question: Which findings are ―really‖ important? One needs
some criterion that can rank-order the importance of the findings. For
example, do the findings predict behavior? (p. 191)
There are quite a few things to unpack in the above quote.

First, according to Triandis‘s

understanding, the emic-etic spectrum is not categorical, but hierarchical.

Second, the

―mainstream psychologists‖ are those who see themselves on the etic/universal side of
the spectrum; they are privileged to be acultural, to be convinced, to recognize or
disregard findings, and to prescribe standards for the importance of research.

Last but

not least, indigenous psychologies are disadvantaged the moment they are placed in the
hierarchical emic-etic spectrum since they fall under the approach named ―Indigenous
Psychology,‖ which is inevitably less than cultural psychology and all other psychologies
on the spectrum. Indigenous psychologies, then, are doomed to be inferior.

Triandis

therefore suggests two ways for indigenous psychologists to correct their methodological
inadequacy so that they may be ―visible‖ to the mainstream.

The first one, as quoted

above, is to conform to the standards prescribed by the mainstream—for example,
―predictive validity‖—to rank their findings.

Second, in order to get the attention of

mainstream psychologists, the best strategy for indigenous psychologists is to become the
examiners of cross-cultural theories rather than to become theorists in their own right. As
Tiandis says,
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Mainstream psychologists pay attention only when they are shown that
their favorite theories are only valid in their own culture, and cannot be
generalized to other cultures. A demonstration of that point is best done
by using the methods of mainstream psychology, in different cultures, and
by showing, for instance, that one obtains the usual findings in the West,
but not in the East. In short, mainstream psychologists are more likely to
pay attention to the findings of cross-cultural than of indigenous or
cultural psychologists. (p. 191)
In the following discussion, I will focus on two aspects of Triandis‘s comparison
of the three psychologies: (a) how indigenous psychology is conceptualized in relation to
the other two psychologies, and (b) how indigenous psychology is situated in the ―culture
vs. universality‖ issue.
John W. Berry, a well-respected Canadian psychologist, was another keynote
speaker representing the cross-cultural perspective at the AASP conference.

Curiously,

being the chief editor of the second edition of the Handbook of Cross-Cultural
Psychology (1997), Berry‘s take on the three psychologies seems to have reflected a
generational difference between the first and the second generation of cross-cultural
psychologists.

Compared to Triandis‘s adamant positivistic and ethnocentric stance,

Berry (2000) attempts to offer a more inclusive position which takes into account the
changes in the field within the past two decades.
For Berry, the emic-etic spectrum on which Triandis relies to compare the three
psychologies appears to be too simple to adequately address the complexity of the affair.
He divides the etic approach into the imposed etic approach4 and the derived etic

4

The usage of the term ―imposed‖ here refers to the ethnocentric nature of the cross-cultural comparisons
done in the early years of cross-cultural psychology.
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approach5 in order to avoid the methodological pitfall of equating the etic with the
universal.
The other noticeable difference from Triandis‘s view is the historical nature of
Berry‘s comparison:

He does not merely compare the three psychologies on the basis of

categorical differences as if they are things to be compared; instead, he tries to more or
less restore the historicity of the approaches—to see them as a historically evolving
―sequence of activities‖ as he compares them (p. 198).

What results from historicizing

the comparison is a framework that integrates the revised emic-etic methodological
distinction with a reinterpretation of the three goals of cross-cultural psychology that
Berry and Dasen proposed in 1974.
From Berry‘s viewpoint, Triandis‘s take on cross-cultural psychology, that is, ―to
transport current hypotheses and conclusions about human behavior to other cultural
contexts in order to test their validity‖ (p. 198), does not cover the full spectrum of the
tasks of cross-cultural psychology.

He refers to Triandis‘s narrowly defined

cross-cultural psychology as the ―imposed etic methodological approach‖ and he argues
that it is only the first goal of cross-cultural psychology (p. 198).
The second goal of cross-cultural psychology, ―to explore new cultural systems to
discover psychological phenomena not available in the first culture,‖ is associated with
the ―emic methodological approach‖ (p. 198).

Berry identifies the emic approach with

the emergence of ―cultural,‖ ―indigenous,‖ and ―ethnic‖ psychologies (p. 198).

As he

argues in an earlier text, this move toward the emic approach has to do with the
―diversification in the notion of culture and how it may be related to psychology‖ (Berry,

5

The usage of the term ―derived‖ here refers to the derivative nature of the cross-cultural comparative
approach proposed by Berry.
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1997, p. xi).

Some of this change came from the influence of cultural anthropology,

especially from one of the most influential interpretive anthropologists Clifford Geertz:
In the 1970s, a move was afoot to emphasize more the symbolic view, in
which culture was to be found within and between individuals in their
shared meanings and practices….This emergent view (in anthropology) of
culture as ‗an historically transmitted pattern of meaning embodied in
symbols‘ (Geertz, 1973, p. 89) and as ‗a conceptual structure or system of
ideas‘ (Geertz, 1984, p. 8) has given rise to a more cognitive emphasis in
psychology on the intersubjective, interpretive conception of culture, now
broadly adopted by those who identify with ‗cultural psychology‘ (Cole,
1996; Shweder, 1990). (Berry, 2000, p. 199)
The other change came from the cultural ―Others‖ who had previously been studied by
cross-cultural psychologists as objects.

As Berry points out,

There can be no doubt that for many years cross-cultural psychology was
done mostly by those in the Western, economically and politically
powerful nations; the objects of their attention were usually ‗others.‘
When these others lived elsewhere, they were ‗tribes,‘ and when they were
closer at hand they were ‗subcultures‘ or ‗minorities.‘ (Berry, 1997, p. xi)
These cultural Others tend to use the emic approach because methodologically it can help
them to ―[understand] themselves in their own terms‖ and ―[draw] upon their own
culturally-rooted concepts and intellectual traditions‖ (p. xi).

As Berry points out, these

cultural Others brought about the emergence of ―acculturation psychology,‖ ―ethnic
psychology,‖ ―indigenous psychology,‖ and ―ethnopsychology‖ (Berry, 1997, pp. xi-xii).
The third goal of cross-cultural psychology is associated with the ―derived etic
methodological approach‖ which seeks to ―integrate psychological knowledge gained
from these first two activities, and to generate a more pan-human psychology that would
be valid for all people‖ (p. 198).

Berry does not believe that one can simply rely on the

imposed etic approach to create a psychology that is universal to all humankind; he
emphasizes that a universal psychology can only come from the derived etic approach

10

that is grounded in a solid foundation of a diversity of cultural or indigenous
psychologies.

So, unlike Triandis, Berry does not prioritize the etic approach over the

emic approach; on the contrary, he seems to have reversed the priority so that the emic
approach becomes the foundation of the etic approach.
first, comparison second‖ rule (p. 202).

This is what he calls the ―culture

Nevertheless, Berry has not given up the pursuit

of a universal psychology, of which the etic approach is an indispensible part.

As he

says,
I consider that the cultural and the comparative perspectives are both
necessary; neither is sufficient (Berry, 1999a). This view was well
argued by Pike (1967) who considered that the emic and etic perspectives
are like the double view one gets from a stereoscope; the object is the
same, but the two optics are slightly different, providing depth, relief and
perspective on what is being observed (see also Berry, 1999b) (p. 201).
This stereoscopic ―double view‖ that integrates the cultural/emic perspective with the
comparative/etic perspective is at the core of Berry‘s argument; he argues that the two
perspectives do not form a dichotomy but a symbiosis in which both are ―necessary‖ and
neither is ―sufficient.‖ However, if one carefully examines the ―symbiosis‖ proposed by
Berry, one finds neither a symbiotic relation (in which each one contributes to the other‘s
existence) nor a stereographic relationship (in which each alone is flat, so to speak), but a
dialectic relation6 in which the cultural/emic approach is needed by the comparative/etic
approach to create a universal psychology.
By carefully reviewing two leading cross-cultural psychologists‘ comparisons of
the three psychologies, we have come a step closer to what I am trying to convey by the
6

Young in his book White Mythologies (1990) has argued that even though the system of Hegelian
dialectic is often used as a conceptual resource to formulate oppression and resistance to it, the system itself
is a product of ethnocentrism (p. 33). As he explains, ―This [dialectic] structure is not, as might at first be
imagined, derived from a fantasy of power relations modeled on a medieval joust but from the
phenomenological account of a subject perceiving an object, a same/other dialectic in which the other is
first constituted by the same through its negation as other before being incorporated within it‖ (p. 37).
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composite term ―recognition/misrecognition.‖ Let me briefly summarize the two
viewpoints to point out the recognition/misrecognition therein.
indigenous psychology is indeed recognized as an approach.

In Triandis‘s article,
However, as an approach,

it is first characterized as an approach doomed to be inferior because it is placed on the
furthest emic end of the emic-etic spectrum, in which the etic end represents the universal
and the ideal, and the emic end represents the cultural and the trivial.

Second,

indigenous psychology is characterized as an inadequate approach: indigenous
psychology is too ―trivially rich‖ to be considered as anything other than subordinate to
the etic/universal approach.

From the above characterization (or image) of indigenous

psychology, this recognition is, in fact, a misrecognition because indigenous psychology
is not seen as a psychology in its own right.

As Oliver (2001) keenly points out, this

form of recognition/misrecognition belongs to ―the particular pathology of colonial and
oppressive cultures‖ (p. 23).

In the context of psychology, this pathology of recognition

has its roots in the colonial relation between mainstream American psychology and
psychologies in other parts of the world, and this relation according to Sinha (1997) is
characterized by domination and neglect.
On the other hand, Berry‘s attempt to create a more inclusive cross-cultural
psychology (rather than in opposition to cultural psychology and indigenous psychology,
as Triandis does) is admirable but still problematic.

With regard to the

conceptualization of the three psychologies, we have learned from Berry as well as
Triandis that if one tries to conceptualize them within an ahistorical framework as
methodological categories, one simply loses sight of the uniqueness of indigenous
psychology because, as a methodological approach, it is not that different from cultural
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psychology.

One has to adopt a historical framework in order to tell the difference

between indigenous and cultural psychology.

Berry has clearly demonstrated that

culture psychology and indigenous psychology are two distinctive events in the history of
cross-cultural psychology.

The emergence of cultural psychology is the result of a

paradigm shift in which the notion of ―culture‖ dramatically changed.

The emergence

of indigenous psychologies is part of a greater event in which the previously objectified
cultural Others began to speak for themselves, to act like subjects.

As Berry describes

it,
Cross-cultural psychology, while still dominated by Western views and
psychologists, is no longer their exclusive preserve. What started as a
Western-based attempt to understand the ―others‖ is now a field
well-populated by these ―others.‖ In part, this has come about by many
developing world psychologists having experienced Western psychology
(as graduate students, as research collaborators, or as ―consumers‖), and
being attached to, and wary of it. (Berry, 1997, p. xiii)
However, the uniqueness of the indigenous psychology movement as an event in which
cultural Others voice their subjectivity is soon covered up by Berry‘s schematization of
the symbiotic integration of three methodological approaches which, as I have pointed
out, is a methodological variation of the Hegelian dialectic.

In Berry‘s grand

schematization of the historical development toward a universal psychology—from the
imposed etic to the emic to the derived etic approach, the function of the emic approach
is to create a diverse knowledge base of indigenous psychologies which can again be
integrated into the etic approach that really generates universal knowledge.
knowledge for whom? One must wonder.

Universal

Is the integration really a symbiosis in

which the integrated knowledge benefits both sides, as Berry has claimed, or is it a
dialectic in which the Others are needed and integrated into the same, as I have argued?

13

Allwood and Berry (2006a) have recently published an international analysis of
the origins and development of indigenous psychologies which might give us some clues
as to this issue.

In their worldwide survey, indigenous psychologists were asked to

briefly address four questions related to the history and characteristics of indigenous
psychology as they understand it in their local context as well as in the global context.
After analyzing their answers, Allwood and Berry found several common themes.

One

theme they found among all indigenous psychologists‘ responses was that ―IP
[indigenous psychology] is a reaction by scholars and practitioners to the dominance of
WP [Western psychology]‖ (2006a, p. 263). This reaction, characterized by Allwood
and Berry as ―post-colonial reactions to mainstream psychology‖ (p. 243), consists of two
parts: first, indigenous psychology is ―viewed as a response that rejects the validity and
usefulness of WP in their societies,‖ and second, it ―also seeks to provide an alternative
psychology to the massive presence of WP in their own society, and internationally‖ (p.
263).

The emergence of indigenous psychologies is therefore, as Sinha (1997) has

observed, a ―crisis‖ reaction in non-Western societies in which ―de-colonization‖ of the
psyche and ―cultural empowerment‖ are desperately needed (p. 137).

Berry‘s (2000)

recognition of indigenous psychology as an event in which cultural Others voice their
subjectivity apparently corresponds to this theme.
On the other hand, Berry‘s (2000) project of a symbiotic universal psychology
does not seem to be well supported among indigenous psychologists.

Indeed, Allwood

and Berry (2006a) did find that more than half of the contributors discussed the
possibility of creating a universal psychology.

However, if one carefully examines the

responses, those who considered that possibility did not emphasize how a universal
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psychology can benefit all humankind; instead, they emphasized that it can ―serve as a
challenge to the presumed universal status of WP‖ (p. 265). In other words, it was the
de-colonizing aspect rather than the symbiotic aspect that was the emphasis of indigenous
psychologists when they considered a universal psychology.

Besides, Berry himself

seems to be aware of the ethnocentric nature of a so-called ―universal psychology‖ in his
2006 article.

As Allwood and Berry (2006a) note, ―while the ‗derived etic psychology‘

may be more informed by many other cultures, it would still remain anchored in one
specific cultural understanding‖ (p. 265).

Moreover, there is another theme that almost

all indigenous psychologists endorsed besides the postcolonial reaction theme: they all
agreed with Sinha (1997) that indigenous psychology is ―a facet of worldwide concern
for making knowledge culturally appropriate‖ (p. 131).

As Allwood and Berry (2006a)

have observed,
IP was seen as an attempt to produce a local psychology within a specific
cultural context….The local culture is unanimously identified both as a
source of inspiration for developing an IP, and as a concrete goal in
achieving an IP….Their unanimous concern with this theme means that it
is widely accepted both as a local characteristic and as a global one. (p.
263)
Thus according to Allwood and Berry‘s analysis, the main concern of indigenous
psychologists is in the local rather than in the universal.

Since a universal psychology is

less an interest of indigenous psychologists, who really needs it? One can reasonably
argue that the project of a universal psychology is a dialectic rather than a symbiotic
process which involves, as Young (1990) has pointed out, ―the creation, subjection and
final appropriation‖ of cultural Others for the sake of Euro-American subjects (p. 33).
Will cultural psychologists, who are often presumed to be more appreciative of
the otherness of other cultures, be able to offer an alternative to the ones already
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examined? Richard A. Shweder, a prominent psychologist whose notion of cultural
psychology is heavily influenced by Geertz‘s Interpretation of Cultures (1973), was also
invited to give a keynote speech at the AASP conference representing cultural
psychology.

In his comparison of the three psychologies, Shweder (2000) argues that

there is hardly any difference between indigenous psychology and cultural psychology,
yet both of them are quite different from cross-cultural psychology which seeks the
uniformity of human behaviors (p. 212).

He argues that cultural psychology is the study

of diverse ―mentalities‖ rather than the study of ―mind,‖ in which the term ―mind‖ refers
to ―the totality of actual and potential conceptual contents of human cognitive processes‖
and the term ―mentality‖ refers to ―the actual cognitive functioning of a particular person
or people‖ (p. 210).

From Shweder‘s perspective, the above characterization of cultural

psychology does not deny the universals of common humanity; nevertheless, he claims
that ―the search for and privileging of things that are uniform across all people and
cultures‖ is not the proper project of cultural psychology (p. 210).

This position is

summarized in his slogan, ―Universalism without the uniformity‖ (p. 210).

Therefore,

the kind of universality, if the term still applies, that Shweder seeks in cultural
psychology is neither a blunt ethnocentric universal, nor a dialectic universal which is
elaborated but nonetheless ethnocentric, but the freedom to get beyond the limitations of
any particular cultural perspective by ―staying on the move between different ways of
seeing and valuing things in the world‖ (p. 219).
At the core of Shweder‘s idea of cultural psychology is this freedom to think
otherwise, to think outside of the limitations given in one‘s own culture. What he does
not quite stress in his keynote speech, however, is the role that cultural Others play in the
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exercise of such freedom.
cultural Others.

This freedom that Shweder espouses actually depends on

As Shweder explains in his major work Thinking through cultures:

Expeditions in cultural psychology (1991):
Cultural psychology is an interpretative enterprise in Geertz‘s sense. Yet
just what is it one actually does in the interpretation of (intentional) worlds
and (intentional) lives? The answer to that question has much to do with
the process of ―thinking through others‖…in at least the four senses…: (1)
thinking by means of the other; (2) getting the other straight; (3)
deconstructing and going beyond the other; and (4) witnessing in the
context of engagement with the other. (p. 108)
In the first sense, as Shweder explains, the other is used to ―reveal hidden dimensions of
our selves‖ (p. 108); in the second sense, the other is rationally reconstructed as having
an internal world or system consisting of ―indigenous belief, desire, and practice‖ in
order to justify the existence of an alternative worldview (p. 109); in the third sense, the
other is ―passed through‖ or ―intellectually transformed‖ into something else by exposing
his or her hidden life or incompleteness (p. 109); and in the fourth sense, the other is
represented or depicted as an ―alien other in an alien land‖ encountered by the
―self-reflexive‖ cultural psychologist whose job is to depict the encounter (p. 110).

One

should have no doubt by now that this ―interpretative enterprise,‖ upon which cultural
psychologists pride themselves, is still another way of using cultural Others for the sake
of Euro-American subjects.
in Shweder‘s formulation.

However, this does not mean that there is no improvement
In his fourth sense of cultural psychology as ―thinking

through others,‖ Shweder does something quite significant (whether he is fully aware of
it or not): he reveals the conditions under which so-called ―cultural knowledge‖ is
produced. It is through the awareness of cultural differences created by the
inter-cultural encounter that a cultural psychologist is able to understand the Others in
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relation to him or herself or to understand him or herself in relation to the Others.
Therefore, the one who is depicting the other should not be left out of the picture because
the representation or knowledge of the other is eventually for oneself; cultural knowledge
is perspectival rather than objective.
Through analyzing the perspectives of psychologists whose works are at the
interface of cultures, I have argued that the recent recognition of indigenous psychology
as a new approach in psychology is a misrecognition of the indigenous psychology
movement. The recognition/misrecognition either adopts the view that indigenous
psychology is a subordinate methodological approach, that it is a dialectic complement
of a futuristic universal psychology which is inevitably ethnocentric, or that it is not
different from cultural psychology, which is a perspectival representation of cultural
Others not yet challenged by the Others themselves.

Despite their efforts to grapple

with the unfamiliar phenomenon called ―indigenous psychology,‖ there remains an
unintended referential framework that determines how the indigenous psychology
movement appears to these psychologists.
On the theoretical level, this unintended yet powerful framework is not different
from what Said (1979) refers to as the discourse of Orientalism or what Hall (1995) refers
to as the discourse of ―The West and the Rest.‖ This powerful discourse not only
determines the form in which the indigenous psychology movement is to be understood
by psychologists, but in many ways also determines how anything ―cultural‖ appears on
the intellectual horizon of psychologists.
The recognition/misrecognition I have identified is not just a one-sided pathology;
it is a two-sided phenomenon.

Not only must Euro-American psychology recognize
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indigenous psychology in a way that does not threaten but enhances or enriches its core
values, its history, and its identity; indigenous psychology also needs Euro-American
psychology to recognize it, to grant it a place in history despite the fact that
Euro-American psychology is the very thing it is fighting against.

It is not difficult to

find this paradoxical desire—a desire to be rid of the influence of the West but at the
same time to be recognized by it—in the works of indigenous psychologists.

For

example, in the introduction of their co-edited book The Sinicization of Social and
Behavioral Science Research in China (1982), Kuo-Shu Yang and Chung-I Wen write:
The subjects whom we studied are Chinese people in Chinese society, but
the theories and methods we used are mostly imported from the West or of
the Western style. In our daily life, we are Chinese; when we are doing
research, we become Western people. We repress our Chinese thoughts or
philosophy intentionally or unintentionally, and make them unable to be
expressed in our procedure of research....Under such a situation, we can
only follow the West step by step with an expectation to catch up their
academic trend….Eventually, our existence in the world community of
social and behavioral science becomes invisible at all. (as cited in Hwang,
2005a, p. 230, italics added)
This paradoxical desire to be recognized by the colonizer or oppressor has been identified
by Fanon in Black Skin, White Masks (1952/1967):
As long as he [the slave] has not been effectively recognized by the other
[the master], that other will remain the theme of his actions. It is on that
other being, on recognition by that being, that his own human worth and
reality depend. It is that other being in whom the meaning of his life is
condensed. (p. 217)
If the dynamics of recognition identified by Fanon hold true, it means that without
unpacking how this recognition/misrecognition works on the subjectivity of the
indigenous psychologists, the indigenous psychology movement will likely go astray—it
will be trapped in the vicious cycle of the pathological searching for recognition rather
than become the driving force of decolonization.
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Chapter 2
At the Center: Psychology and its Imaginary Relation with Others
From 1492 to the 1990s we are dealing not with change, rupture and
difference but rather with suppression, amnesia and deliberate avoidance
of realities, cultural as well as psychological. We are dealing with the
deformed sight of a blinded eye. (Sardar, Nandy, & Davies, 1993, p. 88)
It has been said that there are two kinds of white people: those who have
never found themselves in a situation where the majority of people around
them are not white, and those who have been the only white person in the
room. At that moment, for the first time perhaps, they discover what it is
really like for the other people in their society, and, metaphorically, for the
rest of the world outside the west: to be from a minority, to live as the
person who is always in the margins, to be the person who never qualifies
as the norm, the person who is not authorized to speak. (R. Young, 2003,
p. 1)

Others and the Eye of the World
In 1993, five hundred years after Christopher Columbus‘s historic voyage across
the Atlantic, Indian political psychologist Ashis Nandy and two well-known public
intellectuals of the Muslim world Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Wyn Davies audaciously
revisit the historic voyage and its global aftermath in the short and yet powerful book
Barbaric Others: A Manifesto on Western Racism.

Arguing against the widely held

view that the significance of Columbus‘s journey was that he accidentally discovered the
New World in his first voyage westward, the three authors claim that, except for that it
was an ―unprecedented encounter‖ (p. 1) between the two worlds across the Atlantic,
nothing ―new‖ was ―discovered‖; in fact, the Old World of Europe that Columbus
represented actually ―missed,‖ rather than ―discovered,‖ the novelty of the newness of the
New World.
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The authors point out that, for centuries before Columbus ever landed on the New
World, Europe had already nurtured an ―anxiety-ridden perception‖ (p. 1) about Other
People and about the natural world.

Since those Other People (or Others) were beyond

Europe‘s actual reach and touch, the perception (or imagination) was based primarily on
―fears, fantasies and demons inhabiting the Western mind‖ (p. 1) rather than on the
experiences of actual encounter with the Others.

They further point out that this

perception of Other People was so deeply ingrained that it had become ―an integral part
of Europe‘s self-identity‖ (p. 1).

Under such premises, the ―historic events of 1492‖

actually stood for an unprecedented opportunity for Europe to renew itself: not only to rid
itself of the long-standing anxieties about the unknown Others, but also to redefine
Europe in relation to non-European Others.
Historically, Europe eventually missed the unprecedented opportunity to really
encounter the Others in their newness, in their novelty.

However, what is more

important than missing the opportunity is that, it was not a pure accident that the real
encounter did not happen; there was a constitutive factor that prevented it from
happening.

As the authors keenly point out, the ―blinded gaze‖ of Europe‘s eye of the

world, its oculus mundi, was what was preventing the real encounter with the Others from
happening:
The eye of the West….was blind when it turned to observe what was not
European or Western. When it observed the Other, oculus mundi was
blinded, paradoxically, by its own perceptions and previsions. It not
merely helped falsify the Other, but in fact invented it out of Europe‘s own
inner demons—Europe‘s fears, anxieties, and disowned self. (p. 88)
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Europe‘s own ―perceptions and previsions,‖ that is to say, its own imagination and
anticipation, became the main visual function7 when it gazed upon the Others.

As a

result, when the two worlds across the Atlantic eventually met in 1492, Europe‘s
longstanding imagination of Others was not shattered by the newness of the experience;
on the contrary, it ―acquired flesh‖ (p. 88): what was originally inside the European
psyche was fleshed out and became something observable, something eventually
manageable out in the world.

The subjectivity of Others in the actual world—that is to

say, as real people having their own concerns in their various ways of being in the
world—was denied; they were subjected to the blinded eye.

Europe thus

proceeded to administer and interact with the Others as if they were
nothing other than what it perceived. The vast diversity of peoples
around the world were lumped together for all practical purposes in one,
gigantic category of Otherness. The distinctness of a particular Other
was lost in the generality shared with all Others, that of being different and
sundered from the West. This distinctiveness was left for the experts or
professionals to debate. (p. 89)
Therefore, the real significance of the historic events of 1492 was that it
―established not only what it is to be modern, but what it is to be Other, not European,
distinct from the West‖ (p. 91); in other words, it marked a critical moment in history in
which a ―perversion of reality‖ (p. 91) not only occurred but in the years to come, layer
by layer, gradually structured the core of how Europe relates to the Others.

As a

compiled world atlas, Dutch geographer and map maker Gerhardus Mercator‘s Atlas
(1570) was the most potent legacy of Columbus‘s historic voyage because historically it
was the first embodied display of the world as seen by Europe‘s blinded eye.

7

In his article, ―Allegories of Atlas,‖ Rabasa Jose (1995) brilliantly analyzed the ―visual function‖ of
history. His main argument is that, in the process of creating a map, European history serves as the
inseparable visual function in the personification of geographic space in terms of a Eurocentric perspective.
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The reason why I started out this chapter by reviewing Sardar and the other two
authors‘ explication of Europe‘s problematic relation with Others in Barbaric Others, is
very much the same as theirs when they revisited Christopher Columbus‘s historic
voyage: we are still living out the history of 1492.

History moves rather slowly when

something fundamental has to be changed, especially when it comes to what constitutes
our way of seeing the world.
With the innovations in navigation technique and the breakthrough in navigation
route made by Christopher Columbus, European expansion in the world took off with
unprecedented speed.

By the time of World War I, the imperial powers of Europe had

taken control over ninety percent of the surface territory of the globe (R. J. C. Young,
2001).

In the following years, the traditional imperial powers of Europe suffered a rapid

demise after two World Wars and were replaced by two new powers, the United States
and the Soviet Union in competition for world domination.

And decades later, to the

surprise of many, the seemingly indestructible power of the Soviet Union suddenly
collapsed, with the United States becoming the single dominant power in the world from
the 1990s until now.

However, even though there were changes of players as well as

changes in the form of their world domination (that is, from the direct and more violent
form of control over land and people, to the indirect and more subtle form of control over
the economy in the name of ―world trade‖), Europe‘s oculus mundi, its eye of the world,
did not change much in this competition for world dominance.

On the contrary, as

Rabasa (1995) beautifully said, it resembles ―Caesar‘s laurel crown‖ which has a
transhistorical and transnational dimension.

―Caesar functions as an empty slot where

different leaders may inscribe themselves,‖ said Rabasa. ―Like the symbol of Caesar, the
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world revealed by Mercator‘s Atlas is a transhistorical and transnational theatre where
imperialist configurations take form by means of particular national appropriations‖ (p.
363).

Therefore, as long as taking control is still the main intention in the interaction

with Others, the eye of the world actually does not change.

Just like Caeser‘s laurel

crown, it can be given a different name and then inherited by different world powers.
One way or another, Others are still subjected to the blinded eye, whether of another
world power or, most likely, of a different form of domination.
In comparison to the long history of European expansion, the establishment of
modern universities as the professional site of production for specialized knowledge
came rather late; in fact, it was not until the 19th and 20th centuries that the idea of
―freedom of scientific research, teaching and study‖ and its institutional foundation had
gradually become the standard in universities (Ruegg, 2004).

Therefore, the eye of the

world endorsed and legitimized by European expansion, was inherited by universities as
a part of the European tradition and inevitably shaped the eye of the world of the modern
sciences.

As Haller (1995) points out,

The sciences…became the means through which both scientists and social
scientists sought to determine the relative value of the races of man,
delineate social categories, and even justify the rationale of race
legislation. (p. xii)

Others and the Power-Knowledge-Desire Relations
There is an old Chinese old saying which can be roughly translated as, ―one who
was frightened by a snake sees it everywhere‖; similarly, for a very long time the eye of
the world inherited by the modern sciences could only see Others in the ―perversion of
reality‖ invented by its own blinded gaze, rather than Others in the actual world.
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Historically, the critique of the problematic relation between Europe (or the West) and
Others, and of the perversion innate to its eye of the world almost always came from
Others who were dehumanized by the blinded eye, or from those who have witnessed the
violence resulting from the dehumanizing power of the blinded eye.

It was first voiced

in the analysis of the traumatic effects of the colonial situation written by Western-trained
intellectuals in or from the colonies, such as Mannoni (1950/1990), Fanon (1952/1967),
Césaire (1955/2000), and Memmi (1957/1991).

And later on, with the flow of post-war

immigration from ex-colonies to the West, some migrants, or their children, who
subsequently held positions in universities and still felt strongly about the marginalization
of their places of origin, started to offer profound critiques of the Eurocentric nature of
western history and on the implicit assumptions about Others in western knowledge (R. J.
C. Young, 2001).

Among them the more renowned are: Homi Bhabha, Stuart Hall,

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Dipesh Charkarbarty, and Edward Said, whose eloquent
critique in Orientalism (1978) of the cultural politics in academic knowledge helped
founded the academic field of postcolonial studies.
Mercator‘s Atlas was historically the first embodied display of the world as seen
by Europe‘s blinded eye.

In a similar sense, Said‘s Orientalism was the first systematic

exposure and analysis of the existence of Europe‘s eye of the World.

On the first page

of Orientalism, Said brings out one of his main arguments by introducing an anecdote of
a French journalist‘s regretful comment on the ruined city of Beirut.8

Through a careful

analysis of the rather short comment, he points out that the so-called ―Orient‖ is a
―European invention‖ (p. 1), a ―European representation of the Orient‖ (p. 1, italics

8

The French journalist regretfully wrote, ―it had once seemed to belong to…the Orient of Chateaubriand
and Navel.‖
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added).

He further elaborates by saying that, among all the relations Europe has with

the Orient, the Orient is ―one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other….
The Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea,
personality, experience‖ (pp. 1-2).

He then emphasizes that, even though this Orient is a

representation invented or imagined by the West, it is not merely imaginative but ―an
integral part of European material civilization and culture‖ (p. 2).

Using Foucault‘s

notion of discourse developed in The Archaeology of Knowledge (1971), that is, as a
systematic dispersion of discursive events, Said first delineates the contour of what he
means by the term ―Orientalism‖:
The Orient is an integral part of European material civilization and
culture. Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and even
ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions,
vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies
and colonial styles. (Said, 1978/2003, p. 2, italics added)
And a few paragraphs later, Said further employs the notion of ―power-knowledge
relations‖ developed by Foucault in Discipline and Punish (1975)—which, in Foucault‘s
own words refers to the fact that ―there is no power relation without the correlative
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and
constitute at the same time power relations‖ (p. 27)—to propose a meaning of
Orientalism based on the power-knowledge relations of institutionalized disciplinary
power:
Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for
dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it,
authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over
it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring,
and having authority over the Orient. (p. 3, italics added)
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With the deployment of this authoritative systematic discipline, Said argues that
European culture ―gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as
a sort of surrogate and even underground self‖ (p. 3).
In order to clearly position Said‘s contribution to this project—that is, what
conceptual tools his Orientalism has to offer in the analysis of the problematic relation
between psychology and its Others—I will have to first contextualize Orientalism in the
dialectical history of critical intellectuals‘ struggle to theorize and fight against
colonialism.

Historically, it was not until very recently that we have become aware that

colonialism is a multi-layered form of domination, which involves almost all layers of the
Other‘s daily life—political, economic, cultural, and psychological.

Before the rapid

decolonization of European colonies in the 1940s, most critical intellectuals and
revolutionists in these colonies placed their focus on the political and economic aspects
of colonialism or imperialism.

They argued that the only way for the colonies to be

―self-determined,‖ to be really free from imperial domination, was to become
independent nations.

However, not long after the ex-colonies became independent

nations, they were soon confronted with a harsh reality: independence was not the
antidote to colonialism; on the contrary, it was the beginning of a new form of
colonization in which the newly founded nations were still subservient to, not the old
imperial powers, but the economic system of capitalist power.

Thus, the analysis of

neocolonialism‘s capitalist system on the global scale became the task for many critical
intellectuals.
Compared to the critiques devoted to the political and economic aspects of
colonialism, critical intellectuals‘ identification and analysis of the cultural and
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psychological aspects of colonialism came later in the dialectical process of
understanding aspects of colonialism.

It was not until the disillusionment of those

dreams of political or economic autonomy of the newly founded states that critical
intellectuals turned to those prophet-like sensitive minds (such as Fanon) who, in the
elated atmosphere of independence, had already voiced their concerns about the
psychological and cultural impacts of colonization; they also turned to western critical
traditions other than Marxism for conceptual resources that could be employed in the
identification and analysis of the previously ignored aspects of colonialism.

It was at

this critical juncture in which the reflections on colonial experience and the conceptual
resources from western critical traditions became hybridized, that we were able to
appreciate the theoretical contributions made by Said‘s Orientalism, and thereby to distill
the conceptual tools required in the analysis of the problematic relation between
psychology and its Others.
Generally speaking, critical intellectuals mainly draw upon two western critical
traditions for conceptual resources to deal with the problematics with regard to cultural
and psychological aspects of colonialism: from the tradition of post-structuralism, such as
Derrida‘s (1967/1997) deconstructive methods and Foucault‘s (1971/1972) methods of
discourse analysis; or from another equally important tradition—psychoanalysis,
especially from Lacanian psychoanalysis.

Despite the fact that, as R. J. C. Young (2001)

points out, Said relies more on Derrida‘s deconstructive methods than on Foucauldian
discourse analysis in his actual analyses in Orientalism (p. 388), in terms of the
productivity brought about by Orientalism, Said‘s main theoretical contributions are
along two lines.

His first theoretical contribution is more obvious and frequently
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identified.

It was Said who introduced Foucauldian discourse analysis and the

discussion of power-knowledge relations to the theoretical field of colonial discourse
analysis.

And it is here that the introduction of the notion of discourse is key.

Why?

This has to do with how Foucault constructs the notion of ―discourse.‖ In Foucault‘s
understanding of it, the notion of discourse involves events, discursive events; and
whether or not a discursive event would emerge depends on the contingencies of
historical, material, and institutional conditions (Foucault, 1971/1972).

When

understood as a mode of discourse, Orientalism‘s historical, material, and institutional
aspects become theoretically discernable as constitutive parts of a system of
representation.

With this theoretical foundation, Foucault‘s discussion of

power-knowledge relations can thus be translated to the colonial context as a conceptual
tool utilized in the identification and analysis of how Orientalism—or broadly speaking,
colonial discourse—becomes a discourse of domination, an epistemic violence toward
Others, and eventually a form of cultural and psychological colonization.

Foucault and

Said‘s concerns with the ―discursive regime of knowledge‖ (R. J. C. Young, 2001, p. 385)
will also be one of the main concerns of this part of the project, and the conceptual tools
of Foucauldian discourse analysis will be employed in the analysis of the problematic
relation between psychology and its Others.
Compared to the first contribution, Said‘s second theoretical contribution is not
that obvious because it involves not what he proposes but what he hints at but left
undeveloped.

This undeveloped problematic in Orientalism, briefly said, involves

whether or not the resources of psychoanalysis can be further translated into effective
conceptual tools in the analysis of colonialism.
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The employment of the conceptual resources of psychoanalysis in the analysis of
colonialism first appeared in the works of Mannoni and Fanon, in which the latter is not
only in itself a painful self-analysis of the colonized psyche but also at the same time a
profound critique of the misuse of psychoanalysis in the defense of colonization.
Mannoni (1950) was the first to employ the conceptual tools of psychoanalysis in the
analysis of the so-called ―colonial situation,‖ in the psychological sense of the term (p.
18).

He argues that, if understood at the psychological level, the colonial situation can

be discerned as ―a case of the meeting of two entirely different types of personality and
their reaction to each other― (p. 17), and in such a meeting of the two parties the
European becomes the colonizer and the native become the colonized. The results of this
meeting may be tragic, but it is definitely not accidental.

As Mannoni explains, the

formulation of a colonial situation requires a ―coupling‖ of the two parties involved: it is
a co-creation of the European who behaves like a superior and dominant being due to his
own inferiority complex, and the native who is anxious about being abandoned due to his
or her uncivilized dependency complex.

Therefore, the colonial situation is, as Mannoni

puts it, ―primarily the results of misunderstanding, of mutual incomprehension‖ (p. 31) .
Fanon (1952) recognizes that Mannoni ―has managed to achieve a grasp… of the
psychological phenomena that govern the relations between the colonized and the
colonizer‖ (p. 83), and he also agrees with Mannoni‘s analysis of the colonizer‘s Adlerian
overcompensation-driven behaviors; however, Fanon firmly protests against Mannoni‘s
attribution of the colonized‘s inferiority complex to an ontogenetic origin, that is, as
stemming from his childhood.

Fanon argues that the colonized‘s inferiority complex is

neither ontogenetic nor phylogenic, but sociogenically created in the process of
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colonization; it is primarily an economic inferiority that is subsequently epidermalized9
as an internal complex (p. 11). If the colonizer‘s psychology is also taken into
consideration, Fanon‘s point is that the colonial situation is a black-white relation based
on ―dual narcissism‖ in which ―[t]he white man is sealed in his whiteness, the black man
in his blackness‖ (pp. 9-10).

Fanon‘s formulation of the colonial situation as an

antithetical relation based on narcissism is clearly influenced by Lacan‘s notion of the
mirror stage (p. 161).

Together with his emphasis on the sociogeny of such an

imaginary relation, Fanon translates the conceptual resources of psychoanalysis into the
analysis of colonialism in a powerful and inspiring way:

the traumatizing moment in

which one‘s subject position is configured operates not merely ontogenetically, but also
sociogenetically.

We are thus able to discern the psychological traumas of colonization

as psychoanalytic moments which configure different subject positions in the colonial
situation.

It is therefore theoretically justified, or at least justifiable, when we translate

psychoanalytic concepts in dealing with the problematic of subjectivity in the colonial
situation.
There is no doubt that Said thinks along the lines of Mannoni (1950) and Fanon
(1952), especially the latter, when he discerns the Orient as the Other, as a ―contrasting
image, idea, personality, experience‖ (Said, 1978/2003, p. 2) the West uses to define
itself.

By delineating the Orient as the imaginary representation of the West,

Said is

referring to the colonizer‘s subject position in relation to his narcissistic invention of the
image of the Other, which is clearly a Fanonian proposition.

However, this

psychoanalytic proposition was not further developed in Orientalism.

9

Therefore, the

Epidermalization is a term created by Fanon, which refers to the internalization of inferiority along the
differentiation of skin color.
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insights and the psychoanalytic conceptual tools developed in the previously mentioned
works of Fanon and others were not used to their potential by Said.

In Bhabha‘s (1994)

words, Said pays ―inadequate attention to representation as a concept that articulates the
historical and fantasy (as the scene of desire) in the production of the ‗political‘ effects of
discourse‖ (p. 103, italics added).

In addition, what is more important is that the notion

of discourse and power, translated by Said to colonial discourse analysis, is a notion
Foucault developed during the time of his two major works, The Archaeology of
Knowledge and Discipline and Punish.

This notion of discourse and power, as

evidenced by Foucault‘s modifications of his own theoretical framework in his later
works, does face some theoretical difficulties when dealing with the historical strategic
changes of discursive power and the problematic with regard to subjectivity (Foucault,
1980a).

These theoretical difficulties, naturally, are also reflected in Orientalism:

Orientalism as proposed by Said, is a mode of discourse which continuously dominates,
restructures, and has authority over the Orient by way of producing knowledge; it is an
authoritative power with a somewhat Foucautian will-to-know and will-to-dominate.
Without making some theoretical modifications, it is difficult to conceive of ―the
historical enunciations of colonial discourse,‖ and of ―the process of subjectification as a
placing within…colonial discourse‖ in such a theoretical construct, as Bhabha says (p.
103).
It is on this crucial point that Bhabha (1994) makes an admirable theoretical
intervention.

He creatively rereads Said‘s Orientalism so as to theoretically revamp the

notion of colonial discourse.

Bhabha brings in two new elements to reconstruct Said‘s

more disciplinarily-defined notion of colonial discourse: first, he introduces the notion of
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―apparatus‖ developed in Foucault‘s later work, and redefines colonial discourse as an
apparatus of discriminatory power in which power-knowledge relations are just one of its
many heterogeneous power strategies (p. 100).

Colonial discourse as an apparatus is a

notion which emphasized the strategic function of the use of power.

It does not exclude

or replace Said‘s original insight that colonial discourse is a discursive power but
repositions it as one of many deployable power strategies in a given historical time, that
is, as a ―discursive strategy‖ (p. 95) of the colonial discourse.

And more importantly,

desire is also part of the apparatus of discriminatory power; it is defined as a power
strategy which operates relationally with other deployable power relations, that is, as a
―psychic strategy‖ (p. 95) of colonial discourse.
Second, by giving desire a theoretical place in the apparatus of discriminatory
power, Bhabha further translates psychoanalytical concepts such as fixity, disavowal,
narcissism, fetishism, and identification as conceptual tools in discerning the operation of
desire in relation to other power relations in the colonial situation.

Armed with these

conceptual tools, Bhabha discerns a ―process of ambivalence‖ (p. 95) when colonial
discourse is confronted with the difference of the Other: the Other is always beyond
representation but nevertheless has to be repeatedly represented so as to mask the
irrepresentable difference.

The result of this process of ambivalence is a form of fixity

of colonial subjects to the Other as representation which from Bhabha‘s perspective can
be read in terms of ―fetishism‖ (p. 106).

Bhabha further indicates that this fetish object

or stereotype is at the same time an object of ―surveillance power‖ and an ―object of
desire‖ (p. 109); it is therefore not only a field of the exercise of discursive regime, but
also a field of identification.

Bhabha argues that, it is in the psychoanalytic moments of
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narcissistic identification or disavowal of the Other as representation that the different
colonial subject positions are configured (pp. 109-111).
Without a doubt, Bhabah‘s creative reading of Said‘s Orientalism is a significant
theoretical move in the analysis of colonialism. In his psychoanalytic reconstruction of
the notion of colonial discourse, Bhabha ―upgrades‖ the Foucauldian notion of power
therein and adds the psychoanalytic dimension of desire to the power-knowledge
analytical paradigm, which was originally proposed by Said to merely discern the
discursive regime of colonial discourse.

As a result of his theoretical construction, the

original paradigm has become a power-knowledge-desire analytical paradigm which can
be utilized to discern the apparatus of discriminatory power of colonial discourse.

It is a

significant hybridization for the theoretical field of colonial discourse analysis in which
reflections on colonial experiences and conceptual resources from the tradition of
psychoanalysis and post-structuralism become hybridized in a more comprehensive
theoretical framework to discern the psychological and cultural aspects of colonialism.
In this sense, it is a critical theoretical intervention in the dialectical history of critical
intellectuals‘ struggle to theorize and fight against colonialism.

This

power-knowledge-desire analytical paradigm and its related conceptual tools will be
guiding this project in discerning the problematic relation between psychology and its
Others.

Psychology and Its Others
The problematic imaginary relation between psychology and its Others is rarely
discussed in the literature of mainstream psychology.
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One might defend this negligence

on the part of mainstream psychology by blaming the philosophical connotations of the
term ―the Other‖ and demand that the problem be formulated in a different manner, since
psychology has long since broken away from philosophy and successfully established
itself as an empirical science.

Besides, one might further complain about the title of this

chapter, ―Psychology has an imaginary relation with its Others? What a bizarre way of
talking about psychology!‖ Indeed, most psychologists tend to see what they do as
empirical science and nothing other than that.

For example, they conduct experiments

to study conformity, dissect lab rats‘ brains to explore biological mechanisms involved in
obesity, design computer models to simulate decision making, and use psychological
tests to assess the pathology of their clients. Thus, some of them might argue,
―Psychology is based on the results gained from empirical observations in rigorous
methodological procedures.

It is not based on imagination, not to mention the

imaginary relation with others or whatever that means.‖
It is actually quite understandable why psychologists like to pride themselves on
doing empirical science because historically that depiction has been a hard-earned
recognition from the scientific community at least according to the authoritative story
told repeatedly in most psychology textbooks.

And it is also understandable why most

contemporary psychologists identify psychology as an empirical science since for them it
is the tradition in which they have been trained, and after years of being ―conditioned‖ to
think empirically it is difficult to think otherwise.

In many ways, empiricism has

become one of the fundamental assumptions adopted by psychology which functions
more like a disciplinary ideology rather than a theoretical orientation open for discussion,
as is also pointed out by Packer and Addison (1989, p. 31).
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The problem is, in spite of

the common belief, psychology may not be as empirical as most psychologists would like
it to be.
To begin with, as psychologist and well-respected historian of psychology Kurt
Danziger (1990) points out, psychology does not deal with natural objects, it deals with
―test scores, rating scales, response distributions, serial lists, and innumerable other items
that the investigator does not just find but constructs with great care‖ (p. 2, italics
added).

Which means that, even when a psychologist claims that she or he is doing

―observation,‖ she or he is not just observing but already doing some kind of ―translating‖
which translates things and events in the actual world into, in Danziger‘s (2003) term,
―psychological objects.‖

As he comments in this article in which he proposes to study

the ―biography of psychological objects,‖ there is ―no empirical observation that does not
require some discursive interpretation to give it a communicable form, and the data are
not raw ‗findings‘ but careful constructions in accordance with explicit and implicit rules‖
(p. 21). Therefore, the naturalistic, mutually-independent subject-object relation
assumed in so-called ―empirical observation‖ is more myth than fact in the actual practice
of psychology.
Apart from the fact that empiricism may not to be the best fit for psychology, it
has become an impediment to the development of psychology.

Danziger (1997) points

out that despite the seemingly flourishing appearance created by the constant revamping
of theories, the empiricist tradition of psychology actually fails to render visible, not to
mention corrigible ―the presuppositions about our subject matter that are implied in the
[psychological] categories we use to define the objects of our research and to express our
empirical findings‖ (pp. 7-8).

Consequentially, psychologists act like ―naïve naturalists‖

36

while in fact they are ―conventionalists‖ with regard to the categorical presuppositions
they use to accumulate empirical knowledge.

As Danziger comments, psychologists

―tend to proceed as though everyday psychological categories represented natural kinds,
[and] as though the distinctions expressed in their basic [psychological] categories
accurately reflected the natural divisions among psychological phenomena‖ (p. 8). That
is to say, psychologists trained in the empirical tradition presuppose that there is a sort of
―correspondence‖ between theory and reality, and historically psychologists try to
guarantee this correspondence by being rigorous in methodology.

Nonetheless, no

matter hard they have tried, what they try to fix is something based on, in Packer and
Addison‘s words, ―the impossible ‗correspondence theory‘ of truth‖ which can never be
fixed by methodological modifications (Packer & Addison, 1989, p. 28).
Once the empiricist pretension is unveiled, psychologists will find themselves
awakening to a new scene of psychology that is unfamiliar and challenging, if not
threatening.

They will find that new problems start to emerge although many of them

are really not that ―new‖ but were rendered invisible in the empiricist tradition.

The

problem of ―Others‖ is one of those new yet old challenges to psychology, especially
after the end of the Second World War when psychology gradually became less a
privileged field for White psychologists than a common asset for all (Pickren, 2007).
However, it has not been easy for psychology to realize that its eye of the world has been
blinded; it was when psychology traveled to the edge of the Euro-American world and
suddenly met the firm gazes of Others, or when it was confronted by Others from within,
that psychology awoke to the existence of Others.

At the beginning of his phenomenal

book Naming the Mind: How Psychology Found its Language (1997), Danziger told a
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personal story about how he woke up to the problem of Others.

I will give a shortened

version of it here.
Probably in the late 1950s or early 1960s Danziger went to a university in
Indonesia as a visiting scholar for two years, and one of the requirements was for him to
teach a course on psychology.

When he got there, he found that there was already an

Indonesian professor teaching psychology but of a different kind.

Danziger was excited

to learn that there was an indigenous psychology being taught, so he persuaded the
Indonesia professor to offer joint seminars with him.

That is where the problems started.

In their preparatory discussions about what topics should be taken as important and what
should be left out, they failed to come to an agreement.

The seminar never happened.

Reflecting on the event Danziger thought that he was confronted with psychology‘s
―exotic Dopplegänger‖ and he admitted that it was for him an unsettling experience (p. 2).
Though unsettling, the experience turned out to be a positive one for him. Because of this
experience, Danziger became keenly aware of the categorical presuppositions of
psychology and eventually wrote an insightful book about the history of psychological
categories.

He summarized his experience as follows: ―It is difficult to escape such

reflections when confronted with alternative frameworks for organizing psychological
knowledge and experience.

Certainly, while teaching in Indonesia, I could never forget

that mine was only one possible psychology‖ (pp. 3-4).
On the one hand, it was lucky for Danziger to get involved in a dialogical
situation with the Indonesian professor who was able to confront him with a system of
psychological thinking that is alien to but as valid as western psychology.

On the other

hand, it was also lucky for the Indonesia professor and even the students of psychology to
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have Danziger as an interlocutor who was humble enough to be confronted by
irreconcilable difference and eventually admit that western psychology is only one
possible psychology.

For the most part, especially under the dominance of the empirical

tradition, psychology has not been so merciful to Others or their traditions, as history
shows.

As Holliday and Holmes (2003) point out, historically psychology has been an

accomplice of scientific racism, and the history of ethnic minorities in psychology in the
United States is ―the tale of people who were objects of a concept and
ideology—scientific racism—that was integral to the justification of their oppression and
exclusion‖ (p. 47).

And in his review of the relation between ethnic minorities and

American psychology from 1966 to 1980, Pickren (2004) also shows that it was through
continuous advocacy and activism that ethnic minorities forced mainstream American
psychology to ―yield a place at the table to non-White, non-European individuals‖ (p. 45).
Furthermore, psychology did not have an honorable record when it expanded outside of
the Euro-American world.

As Staeuble (2006) says, ―the distortion and destruction of

the knowledge systems of the colonized have been both a precondition for the
establishment of the positional superiority of Western knowledge and a lasting obstacle to
postcolonial attempts at establishing alternative cultures of knowledge,‖ and psychology
is ―part of the disciplinary order of Western knowledge‖ (p. 185). Therefore, in terms of
psychology‘s relation with Others, it is fair to postulate that psychology functions like an
apparatus of discriminatory power.

Psychology as an Apparatus of Discriminatory Power
At the time of imposing his domination, in order to justify slavery, the
oppressor had invoked scientific argument. (Fanon, 1964/1967, p. 43)
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The problem is, therefore, in what ways are Others—as real people having their
own concerns in their various ways of being in the world—represented or constructed as
speculatable, and even controllable, ―psychological objects‖ when psychology is
discerned as an apparatus of discriminatory power?
To begin with, how do we define ―psychological objects‖? And in what ways
are they constructed? Danziger (2003) points out that psychological objects, like any
other scientific objects, are not just manipulanda, things to be manipulated; they exist
historically and change over time.

Therefore, to study psychological objects in a way

proper to their way of existence is to study their historicity, that is, how they come to be
as such; or in Danziger‘s metaphor, to study their ―biography.‖ Danziger defines the
―biography‖ of scientific objects (which includes psychological objects) as
the historical study of how domains of phenomena come to be constituted
as such, and how they are transformed into objects of scientific scrutiny
and manipulation, how they grow and gain in saliency, and how they
change with age and are eventually supplanted or given a new identity. (p.
20)
Because Danziger (1990) is well aware that historically scientific psychology is a social
practice which in essence is an empirical investigative practice based paradigmatically on
the notion of experiment, he argues that psychological objects should not be identified
merely as ―discursive objects‖ but as ―epistemic objects‖ which in their making involve
both discursive and nondiscursive practices.

The term ―discursive‖ as used by Danziger

in this article is rather different from that used by Foucault in The Archaeology of
Knowledge, in which he, for the most part, reserves the usage of the term ―discourse‖ and
its adjectival form ―discursive‖ for the archaeological study of knowledge, that is, the
study of discourse as event.

On the other hand, Danziger uses ―discursive practice‖ to
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refer to either the practice which involves theoretical construction or some kind of
interpretative activities, or the practice which is potentially theorizable or interpretive for
those who are involved in the practice at a given historical time.

Danziger further

explicates that, in the making of psychological objects, discursive practice involves the
―theoretical construction‖ that goes into the making of such objects; and nondiscursive
practice involves the ―procedures‖ which instantiate the theoretical construction in
―empirical exemplars‖ (p. 21).

He emphasizes that even though the procedures, tools,

and instruments used in nondiscursive practice are closely related to discursive practice,
they cannot be treated as part of discursive practice; they have their own history which
should not be seen as identical to that of discursive practice.
empirical nature of psychology,

In sum, due to the

psychological objects, argues Danziger, ―represent a

fusion of the theoretical and the empirical‖ (p. 21) and changes in any of the two
constitutive practices will be reflected in the configuration of psychological objects.
To a great extent, Danziger has crafted a systematic approach to psychological
objects as epistemic objects.

But this is not quite enough.

As we have learned from

the dialectical history of critical intellectuals‘ struggle to theorize and fight against
colonialism, as an ambivalent object, the representation of Others is more than an
epistemic object but also an object of desire; desire is an indispensible dimension in the
exercise of the discriminatory power.

To further our discussion regarding how in the

process of representing Others the representation itself is at the same time an epistemic
object and an object of desire, an explication of Foucault‘s notion of an apparatus will be
necessary here.
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I would like to first point out that Danziger‘s explication of psychological objects
can easily be integrated into Foucault‘s notion of an apparatus, even though Danziger
seems to disagree with Foucault‘s overemphasis on the discursive, which is, as I have
pointed out above, a disagreement in terminology than anything else.

An apparatus is,

as Foucault says,
A thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourse,
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative
measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic
propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the
elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations
that can be established between these elements. (p. 194, italics added)
If representing Others is considered to be part of psychology‘s strategic deployment of its
discriminatory power over Others, Foucault‘s notion of an apparatus as a ―heterogeneous
ensemble‖ which includes the said and the unsaid to a great degree echoes Danziger‘s
emphasis on both the discursive and nondiscursive practices in the making of
psychological objects.

I would also like to further point out that, in Foucault‘s dialogue

with psychoanalyst Jacques-Alain Miller, his modification of the notion of episteme not
only echoes Danziger‘s notion of psychological objects as epistemic objects, but also
clarifies for us how episteme functions in the making of psychological objects. Foucault
redefines the episteme as
the strategic apparatus which permits of separating out from among all the
statements which are possible those that will be acceptable within….a
field of scientificity, and which it is possible to say are true or false. The
episteme is the ‗apparatus‘ which makes possible the separation, not of the
true from the false, but of what may from what may not be characterized
as scientific. (p. 197)
That is to say, the two practices that Danziger points out function as the episteme of
psychology‘s strategic deployment of its discriminatory power over Others; their working
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together determines what can be accepted as ―scientific‖ statements in representing
Others as psychological objects.
However, as I pointed out earlier, the representation of Others is more than an
object of the discursive regime but also an object of desire.

Therefore, while Danziger‘s

notion of psychological objects as epistemic objects provides us with an approach to the
necessary conditions for Others to be represented as psychological objects—that is,
Others have to be ―scientifically‖ represented—is itself insufficient to account for either
the strategic choice of what (e.g., why ―intelligence‖? ) in Others is to be represented, or
for the historical changes of the representation of Others (e.g., from the Others as a
statistical variation to the Other as an agent of a culture system).

Both of them—the

strategic choice of the signifier of difference and the psychic investment/withdrawal of
such a signifier—point to the dimension of desire in an apparatus of discriminatory
power.

Foucault in his later works proposes the notion of an apparatus as a modification

of his notion of discourse, which put too much emphasis on synchronic analysis and
ignored the diachronic aspect of the exercise of power.

His emphasis on the strategic

nature of the apparatus provides us with a theoretical foundation to discern the role
played by desire in psychology‘s exercise of its discriminatory power over Others
regarding the strategic choice and the historical changes of psychological objects as the
representation of Others.

Regarding the strategic nature of the apparatus, Foucault says,

the apparatus is essentially of a strategic nature, which means assuming
that it is a matter of a certain manipulation of relations of forces, either
developing them in a particular direction, blocking them, stabilizing them,
utilizing them, etc. The apparatus is thus always inscribed in a play of
power, but it is also always linked to certain coordinates of knowledge
which issue from it but, to an equal degree, condition it. This is what the
apparatus consists in: strategies of relations of forces supporting, and
supported by, types of knowledge. (Foucault, 1980a, p. 196)
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Foucault points out that, the major function of the apparatus at a given historical moment
is to respond to an ―urgent need‖ (p. 195).

And as Bhabha (1994) points out, this urgent

need for the colonial discourse is the ambivalence caused by encountering the difference
of Others:

Others must be represented and represented repeatedly so that their

essentially irrepresentable difference can be masked by the representation of Others.
This is how desire plays a role in the apparatus of discriminatory power: as a psychic
strategy in reaction to a potentially traumatizing encounter, a play of identification in
relation to the representation of Others.

And in the case of psychology, this dance

between power, knowledge, and desire substantializes itself in the history of Others as
psychological objects, in the fixity and repetition of the representation of Others as an
―impossible‖ object of desire.

From Racial Other to Cultural Other
The issue is not whether human beings are biological organisms with
intrinsic characteristics. Man can‘t fly and pigeons can‘t talk. Nor is it
whether they show commonalities in mental functioning wherever we find
them. Papuans envy, Aborigines dream. The issue is, what are we to
make of these undisputed facts as we go about explicating rituals,
analyzing ecosystems, interpreting fossil sequences, or comparing
languages. (Geertz, 1984, p. 268, italics added)
When one looks back on the history of psychology with a sensitivity to how
Others are represented in psychology, one cannot but notice how insistent psychology has
been in finding ways to represent Others.
be represented, one way or another.
of Others is the racial Other.

It is an imperative to psychology: Others must

Historically, psychology‘s earliest representation

However, the concept of ―race‖ and its related theories

were not psychology‘s invention, but were inherited as a legacy of the European world‘s
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complicated history of interacting with Others.

Etymologically speaking, the concept of

―race‖ can be traced back to the end of the 15th century (Oxford English Dictionary),
when Europeans started sailing south and then eventually west to bypass the
Muslim-dominated East in order to find new paths of trading unrestricted by the Muslims.
The concept of ―race‖ is mainly used to differentiate the ―Us race‖ and the ―Other race‖
which, in a more Bhabharian term, is essentially a signifier of difference.

As a signifier,

―race‖ originally came from the traditional cultural-linguistic matrix of the European
world, but as the matrix was changed by the European world‘s further experience with
Others (for example, slavery or colonization), or itself changed by having a new element
introduced (for example, evolutionary thought), ―race‖ as a signifier of difference
changed accordingly.
For example, Richards (1997) points out that, in the traditional Christian
cosmology, ―‗Mankind‘s‘ basic unity was an article of faith: we are all descendants of
Noah‘s sons and daughters-in-law‖ (p. 1).

This is why at the beginning of the European

expansion, dark-skinned Africans were considered to be the descendants of Ham, Noah‘s
cursed son.

For Europeans at the time, ―blackness‖ registered the difference between

the ―Us race‖ and the ―Other race‖; we are all the descendents of Noah, but they are from
the cursed Ham, therefore they are ―eternally ordained to be inferior ‗hewers of wood
and drawers of water‘‖ (p. 1).
However, as Western history proceeded, differences in the experience of Others
also contributed to how difference was registered in ―race.‖ For example, in Richards‘
“Race”, Racism, and Psychology: Towards a Reflexive History (1997), the history of the
concept of ―race‖ in the United States and in Europe cannot really be seen as one but has

45

to be treated separately as two genealogies.

In the United States, the Native Americans

who survived massive genocides were mostly ―cornered‖ in the reservations and
therefore posed no threat; therefore, for white Americans, the major Others were the
dark-skinned African slaves who lived among them.

Thus ―race‖ in the United States

mainly registered the ―negro vs. white‖ binary and it was not until much later, when the
United Stated became populated with people with different skin colors, that the
differential registry of ―race‖ became the ―colored vs. white‖ binary.

On the other hand,

because historically Europe dominated non-European Others through colonization,
Others were those who lived outside the European world in ―primitive‖ and
―non-civilized‖ areas; the concept of ―race‖ in Europe therefore registered the ―primitive
vs. civilized‖ binary which reflected the colonial experience of the European world.
However, after the Second World War, Europe and the United States seemed to
have changed seats regarding their relations to Others: Others from ex-colonies flooded
to the European world and therefore Europe is forced to face Others from within; on the
other hand, the United States had become the dominant world power, and started to
interact more frequently with Others outside of the American world.

These new

experiences of interacting with Others in many ways changed the fate of ―race‖ as an
effective signifier of difference, whether it continued to be psychically invested to
represent Others, to rationalize the domination over Others, or at the same time
effectively mask the anxiety cause by the difference of Others.
While ―race‖ as the signifier of difference was not psychology‘s own invention,
psychology did play a critical role in making the racial Other a scientific object.

In fact,

as Richards (1997) points out, psychology from its very beginning was deeply involved
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in the enterprise of scientific racism—the repeated attempts to make the racial Other a
scientific object.

In another major work, Richards (2002) identified two major trends of

thought which helped found psychology: first, the experimental methodology which
consists of two wings, the experimental/empirical wing pioneered by scholars like Gustav
Fechner and William Wundt, and the statistical wing represented by Francis Galton and
Karl Pearson; and second, evolutionary thought associated with Charles Darwin and
Herbert Spencer (p. 32).

If we review the influences these two trends had on the

establishment of psychology as a empirical science, with a focus on how they helped to
formulate the discursive and nondiscursive practices of the discipline, we will find that
these two trends of thought also profoundly influenced how the racial Other was
constructed as a psychological object.
Evolutionary thought had a profound influence on many of the so-called ―modern
sciences,‖ psychology included.

The major contribution of evolutionary thought was

that it provided Europeans with a new self-image which liberated them from the Christian
cosmology and thus allowed them to no longer define themselves in terms of the articles
of faith.

However, this new self-image not only implied that Europeans gradually saw

themselves as ―Homo sapiens,‖ as one among many species evolved in the long history
of evolution, it also implied that the world in which the Europeans dwelled was gradually
separating itself from the Biblical world.

Therefore, the relation between Europeans and

the other species, and the relation between Europeans and the natural world had to be
reconsidered and redefined.

The amazing productivity of evolutionary thought lay in

the passion as well as the anxiety evoked by these yet-to-be-answered questions.
case of psychology, evolutionary thought supplied an ―overarching integrating
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In the

framework‖ for different psychological inquires such as ―animal behavior, child
development, individual differences, physiological psychology, social psychology,
psychopathology, emotion and the very nature of ‗Mind‘ itself‖ (Richards, 1997, p. 1).
With the emergence of these new domains of psychological inquiry, we find that
evolutionary thought provided psychology with a kind of ―comparative homology,‖10 so
that various differences such as developmental difference, individual difference, species
difference, racial difference, or psychological difference could become visible through
comparison using a certain hypothesis of sameness.

Since evolution is essentially a

biological process, all these comparisons are fundamentally biological in nature.
The discursive practice involved in the making of the racial Other as a
psychological object started along the lines of biological comparison.

For example,

early in the history of psychology the ―Spencer hypothesis‖11 was repeatedly used to
measure the difference between the ―white race‖ and the other ―lower races,‖ but most of
the results did not confirm the Spencer hypothesis (Richards, 1997).

These failed

attempts did not discourage psychologists from finding other possible differences
between the ―white race‖ and other ―races.‖

When American psychology gradually

formulated its own brand of psychological categories, such as ―behavior‖ and
―intelligence,‖ as is explored historically by Danziger (1997), ―behavioral performance‖
and ―intelligence test scores‖ became other sites of possible difference.

For example,

American psychologists attempted to measure difference in school performance between
10

R. J. C. Young (2001) comes up with this term in his chapter on Foucault. Foucault thinks that
ethnology consists of a structural science predicated on a hypothesis of sameness which enables it to
theoretically approach other cultures; and in Yang‘s term, this is a kind of ―comparative homology‖
exercised by ethnology (pp. 396-397).
11
The ―Spencer hypothesis‖ hypothesizes that the amount of energy allocated to higher functions of reason
and will is greater in whites than in ―primitives‖; therefore, ―primitives‖ should outperform whites in
simple tasks such as reaction time (RT). As Richards (1997) points out, proving/disproving the
hypothesis creates an obvious ―no-win situation‖ for non-whites.
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―Negro‖ children and ―white‖ children as a scientific proof to justify the continued
segregation of education in the American South; and Army tests were used to justify the
hostile immigration policy toward southern European immigrants (Richards, 1997).
These attempts failed eventually; they were proven to be either scientifically dubious or
else the difference in performance could be better accounted for as originating from
socio-economic difference than from ―racial‖ difference.
The racial Other, as a psychological object based on evolutionary thought,
gradually became socially undefendable in discursive practice.

Racial difference had

been repeatedly used to provide scientific justification for injustices toward non-whites,
which gradually evoked opposition and criticism not only from within the psychology
community but also from the public, especially from the popular liberal press and black
magazines.

By 1930, race psychology as a specialized subfield in psychology was

under a lot of social pressure (Richards, 1997).

But more importantly for psychology as

an empirical science, the racial Other as a psychological object was also scientifically
undefendable in nondiscursive practice. In the case of making the racial Other a
psychological object, discursive practice provides the theoretical construction to account
for how the racial Other is different from us through comparison, or in other words, the
necessary signifier of difference; and the nondiscursive practice provides empirical
procedures to instantiate the signifier of difference in concrete experimental setting.
And historically ―race‖ as an essentially biological signifier of difference had proven to
be difficult to instantiate in concrete experimental settings by empirical procedures as a
scientific object in nondiscursive practice.
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The nondiscursive practice discussed by Danziger mainly involves the
problematic of measuring: how does one properly translate the theory or hypothesis
constructed in the discursive practice into a measurable variable in order to instantiate
the theoretical construction or hypothesis in the concrete experimental setting by
empirical procedures? In the history of scientific racism, measuring had always been
problematic, especially for those who attempted to empirically validate racial difference.
As Richards (1997) points out, early in the history of scientific racism, physical
anthropologists were obsessed with ―fleshing out‖ evidence of racial difference by
measuring skulls.

Their research results were not influential in psychology as a whole,

but their obsession to measure was definitely inherited by psychologists.
Historically for psychology, statistical method is at least as important as
experimental method, if not more important. This is especially true with regard to the
history of making the racial Other a psychological object.

Compared to those obsessive

physical anthropologists, psychology had better theoretical architects in the constructing
of racial difference.

In fact, Francis Galton, the major architect of scientific racism, was

also one of the main founders of the statistical method in psychology.

With the efforts

of Galton and other British statisticians, the statistical method became psychology‘s most
powerful tool in discerning and constructing difference.

It eventually constituted a

relatively independent subdiscipline of psychology, namely psychometrics, which
specialized in the theory and technique of measuring psychological properties.

In the

early years of psychology, the more statistically-minded psychologists‘ main concern was
how to theorize and measure the individual or racial difference in heredities due to the
influence of evolutionary thought.

However, as more psychological categories such as
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―intelligence,‖ ―behavior,‖ and ―personality‖ started to emerge, the theory and technique
of psychometrics were modified or revamped accordingly to measure individual and
group difference in those categories, racial difference included.
Through our brief review of the history of psychology‘s experimental
methodology, it is fair to say that this experimental methodology gradually evolved to be
psychology‘s most powerful weapon: a quantifying tool which consists of the empirical
procedures to instantiate theoretical constructions in the experimental setting, and of the
statistical methods to processes the experimental results; it became psychology‘s ―proof‖
of its credibility to the scientific community.

However, in its actual operation,

especially with regard to how the difference of Others is constructed and measured, it is a
rather unique and powerful mode of representing difference: it quantitatively constructs
the difference of Others through theoretical comparison based on the hypothesis of
sameness, and instantiates such a difference in concrete experimental settings by
empirical procedures.

And as we have seen in our brief historical review, this mode of

representing difference as a nondiscursive practice has a relatively independent existence
from the discursive practice of ―race,‖ the signifier of difference.

As a result, even if

―race‖ had gone through some modifications in its differential registry, or could no longer
be defended as the signifier of difference in discursive practice, this mode of representing
difference was rather unaffected and continued to evolve by modifying itself accordingly
to the change of differential registry.

Therefore, the demise of the signifier ―race‖ is not

the critical issue; as long as there is another signifier of difference to replace ―race,‖
psychology can still effectively construct another psychological object to represent
Others by this powerful quantifying tool.

In this sense, the Other is always measureable
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and representable; as E.L. Thorndike says, ―everything which exists must exist in some
quantity and can therefore be measured‖ (as quoted in Richards, 2002, p. 252).
Around the mid-1930s, because of the social pressure and criticism from within
the scientific community, ―race‖ was less psychically invested and was no longer able to
function effectively as the signifier of difference in the discursive practice of psychology.
Some psychologists started to wonder why there was a need to see differences in ―race‖
which later became a blooming interest in racial prejudice and attitudes (Richards, 1997).
It was not until the rise of Nazi anti-Semitism in Germany that American psychologists
started to view, from the outside, how ―race‖ as the signifier of difference could be
utilized politically and ideologically as a way of justifying oppression.
was the straw that broke the camel‘s back, so to speak.

The Holocaust

After the Second World War,

―race‖ as the signifier of difference became almost psychically withdrawn; ―race‖
became a taboo, a forbidden signifier which, if named, had the capacity to bring on the
most unimaginable disasters.
However, for psychology as a whole, most psychologists did not really see the
problem in representing Others by way of quantified difference, which always refers to a
norm set in ―white‖ terms, so to speak; therefore, it was not that Others should not be
represented, but that ―race‖ itself was a ―bad‖ signifier of difference.

On the other hand,

this powerful quantifying tool could also be used in ways other than justifying racism.
In fact, liberal psychologists, black psychologists, or so-called ―ethnic minority‖
psychologists theoretically constructed difference based on economic and social factors
and used this quantifying tool to argue that the difference of Others was actually not
racial but economic and social (Holliday & Holmes, 2003).
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After the mid-1930s, the attempt to make the racial Other into a psychological
object was temporarily dead.

Some psychologists started to wonder, ―Why is there a

need to see the difference in race?‖ This wonder evoked a great deal of interest in the
study of racial prejudice and attitudes; ―racism‖ rather than ―race‖ became the focus of
psychologists‘ theoretical interest (Richards, 1997; Samelson, 1978).

However,

reflection on the Nazi experience turned psychologists to the study of how personality
and social group affect human behavior (Richards, 2002). This research not only
reminded American psychologists to be more aware of the fact that human are social
beings, but also inspired them to be more actively involved in social issues.

Due to both

the theoretical and the activist involvement of psychologists in social issues, social
psychology became a salient field in psychology, and psychology as a whole became
more receptive to the idea that social context is crucial in the understanding of human
behavior.

In a sense, this emphasis on contextual significance was a prelude to the

emergence of the cultural Other.

Social psychology to a great extent paved the way for

the cultural Other to emerge since ―culture‖ was considered to be one of the social
dimensions of human existence.
More importantly, psychology itself went through dramatic changes after the
Second World War, both internationally and domestically.

Domestically, besides the

post-war immigrations from Europe, the change of immigration policy in 1965 drastically
changed the ―color component‖ of the American population, and psychology in no way
could resist this change.

More and more ―colored people‖ or ―ethnic minorities‖

became or fought to become members of the psychology community.

Once they

entered the system, they became dissatisfied by or disillusioned with psychology‘s
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explicit and implicit ways of excluding their representation in psychology, in both senses
of the term.

Therefore, they not only wanted to be the Others in psychology (for

example, they asked for more institutional representation), they also objected to how they,
as Others of psychology, were represented (or the lack thereof) by psychology (Holliday
& Holmes, 2003).

Historically, this was how psychology in the United States became

more diversified.
Internationally, the United States had become one of the two dominating world
powers, and in order to contain communism from spreading, the United States tried
aggressively to make friends in the world by economic and political supports, as well as
sharing its higher educational resources with the rest of the world by funding
international students.

As a result, American psychology spread from its traditional

Euro-American centers to places where psychology as a discipline was never present or
only vaguely present.

In the 1970s, when these non-traditional centers of psychology

became more established, psychologists from these centers became aware that the
psychology they had learned was not ―relevant‖ to the concerns in their own societies
(Azuma, 1984; Sinha, 1993).

Thus, they initially argued that the concerns in their

societies should be properly represented by psychology, but later more of them started to
advocate for a psychology of their own that better addresses these concerns (Enriquez,
1993; Kim, 1990; Mataragnon, 1979; Yang, 1997). Historically, this was how
psychology became more internationalized.
―Culture‖ as the signifier of difference for psychology emerged in this post-war
condition in which psychology became more diversified in the United States (I would
argue in Canada as well) and became more internationalized around the globe.
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In this

gradually diverse and international condition, there is a lacuna in psychology‘s discursive
practice with regard to Others: it did not have a proper term to replace ―race‖ as the
signifier of difference.

Therefore, when psychologists took from anthropology the

concept of ―culture,‖ which itself is a rather disputed concept among anthropologists
(Kuper, 1999), to account for the difference of Others, it quickly became the preferred
signifier of difference in place of ―race.‖ The boom in culture-related
psychologies—such as ethnopsychology, cross-culture psychology, cultural psychology,
and indigenous psychologies—starting in the 1970s is historical evidence of this
metonymy of the signifier of difference in psychology.
From the perspective of power, ―culture‖ as the signifier of difference is not just a
replacement of ―race,‖ but a strategically ―better‖ signifier of difference—not only for the
psychology establishment, but also for psychology‘s Others.

It is a signifier that is

abstract enough; as Radcliffe-Brown (1940) says, ―we do not observe a ‗culture,‘ since
that word denotes, not any concrete reality, but an abstraction, and as it is commonly used
a vague abstraction‖ (p. 2).

But at the same time, it can refer to almost anything, as this

most quoted definition of culture in culture-related psychology says:
Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior
acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive
achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts;
the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived
and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; cultural systems
may on the one hand be considered as products of action, on the other as
conditioning elements of further action. (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952, p.
181)
As a result, we can see that mainstream psychology and culture-related psychologies all
work around the concept of ―culture‖ each in their own way.

Representing the cultural

Other has become a battle on many fronts: domestically in the United States, and globally
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in non-traditional centers of psychology; and a battle in many forms: institutionally in the
establishment of psychology, discursively in the form of and right to representation, and
―desirously‖ in the struggle with one‘s identity beyond identification with the idealized
mainstream American psychology.
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Chapter 3
At the Margins: A History Misrecognized and Misappropriated
History, like science, is controversy, not story-telling. (R. M. Young,
1966)
In September 2009, the Taiwanese Psychological Association (TPA) held its 48 th
annual meeting at the Psychology Department of the National Taiwan University (NTU).
That year was also the Department‘s 60th year since its establishment in 1949.

Since it

was the first, and for almost 20 years the only, psychology department in Taiwan, many
Taiwanese psychologists tend to think that psychology in Taiwan began with the
establishment of the Department.

Therefore, the fact that this annual meeting was

hosted by the Psychology Department of NTU in its 60 th year made it a historically
significant event.
In traditional Taiwanese/Chinese chronology, sixty years of time is marked as one
jia zi, and the end of that implies that something has almost gone through a full cycle of
its life, and is about to enter a new one.

The year 2009, therefore, symbolically stood

for psychology in Taiwan having almost gone through its first developmental stage, and
was about to enter a new one.

Traditionally people would devote some time to reflect

on the past if they realized that something, if it mattered to them, had been in existence
for one jia zi. They would take that brief but precious moment to reflect on how things
had come to be the way they were, both good and bad, so as to celebrate what they had
achieved and to learn from their past mistakes.

It was only at these brief moments of

historical reflection that people are able to temporarily detach themselves from the daily
routine and have a clearer view of their own life trajectories.
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There is no doubt that TPA was aware of the historical significance of holding the
annual meeting at the Psychology Department of NTU in 2009.

As Li-Jen Weng, then

president of the TPA and the chair of the Psychology Department at NTU said, TPA
decided to take this opportunity to invite Taiwanese psychologists to ―review the one Jia
zi of the development of psychology in Taiwan, so as to preview the future‖ (Weng,
2009).

Three venerable professors—Dr. Ying-Mao Liu (experimental and cognitive

psychologist), Dr. Yung-Ho Ko (clinical psychologist), and Dr. Kuo-Shu Yang (social
and personality psychologist)—were invited as keynotes to address the audience about
the historical development of their respective fields in Taiwan; other participating
psychologists were also invited to speak on subjects related to the history or the future of
the development of psychology in Taiwan.
Indeed, the 48th annual meeting of the TPA could have been an extraordinary
event, given that it took place at a historically significant time at a historically significant
site.

Disappointingly, the meeting turned out to be no more than an ordinary annual

meeting.

The keynote addresses were almost the only section of the meeting that

responded to the main theme designated by the TPA, most presenters did not bother to
contextualize their own work in a historical manner, not to mention providing either a
―review‖ or ―preview‖ of the development of their respective field.

What most

participating psychologists presented at the meeting was research reflecting their current
interests, and the historical dimension of such research was limited to the form of
―literature review,‖ which could only afford a rather limited history of the subject in
question.

On the other hand, the keynote addresses of the three venerable professors,

which constituted almost the only historical section of the meeting, were presented
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mostly in the form of exhibiting past achievements, a privileged honor belonging to
veterans.
Nevertheless, in their brief previews of the future development of psychology in
Taiwan, one cannot but notice a sense of urgency in their tone, especially in Ko and
Yang‘s speeches.

Both of them showed a great deal of eagerness in conveying to the

audience that the development of psychology in Taiwan is indeed at a historical crossroad.
Ko (2009), as a seasoned clinical psychologist, appeals to the new generations that ―the
most important thing right now for the development of clinical psychology in Taiwan is
to construct our own clinical psychological theories‖ (p. 55); and Yang (2009)
encourages the new generations to continue the revolution of hua ren12 indigenous
psychology he and others started more than 30 years ago (p. 86). In his keynote address,
Ko emphasizes that ―theory is the soul of a discipline‖ (p. 57) and he expects seasoned
clinical psychologists to take the initiative to theorize on the basis of their years of
clinical experience, rather than relying indolently on Western theories.

Ko emphasizes

that, without the will and capacity to indigenously theorize clinical experience, the
practice of clinical psychology in Taiwan would always be ―clinical psychology in
Taiwan‖ rather than ―Taiwanese clinical psychology,‖ and in that case it would be
nothing but a ―soulless‖ psychology (p. 57).

12

The two terms ―hua ren‖ and ‖zhong guo ren‖ are not distinguishable in English; they are both
translated as ―Chinese.‖ The term ―zhong guo ren‖ is considered, especially by Taiwanese, to be a term
with too many political implications (for example, Taiwanese and Chinese are both zhong guo ren and
therefore the future of Taiwan is to return to the welcoming arms of China), and therefore has gradually lost
its currency in the daily language use of Taiwanese as a term to refer to themselves; Taiwanese now prefer
to identify themselves as ―tai wan ren‖ rather than ―zhong guo ren.‖ However, it is also undeniable that
Taiwanese and Chinese do share the same cultural-linguistic matrix to a great extent. The term ―hua ren‖
is therefore being used more frequently in recent years to replace the term ―zhong guo ren‖ because of its
emphasis on the shared cultural-linguistic aspect rather than the divided political aspect between the
Taiwanese people and the Chinese people.
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Ironically, Yang and Wen (1982) use the same expression ―soulless‖ to describe
the condition of psychology in the mid-1980s, and one could even say that this very
awareness of the soulless condition of psychology was what led to the indigenous
psychology movement nearly 30 years ago.

Hearing the same ―diagnosis‖ being given

again to describe the condition of psychology in Taiwan after three decades of the
indigenous psychology movement is bewildering.

What is more troubling is the

indifference shown by most participating psychologists to the invitation to historically
reflect.

It is almost like history does not matter, be it the historical reflection of their

predecessors in psychology, or the historical significance of their own work.

Lessons from the History of Psychology
History of psychology is not a salient field in Taiwan. Most Taiwanese
psychologists are not particularly interested in looking back into the past of psychology.
The history of psychology in their view is, metaphorically speaking, like a long and
winding river which has a clear directional flow.

The outline of the story of psychology

can probably be best summarized in the following banal expression: ―psychology has a
long past but a short history.‖13

The long past of psychology is usually mentioned rather

briefly in this story; for example, in an introduction to psychology textbook by Wade and
Tavris (2003), this long past of psychology is presented in the section of ―Psychology‘s
Past: From the Armchair to the Laboratory ‖ and it traces the history of psychology back
to Greek thinkers because they ―raised questions that today would be call psychological‖
13

Hermann Ebbinghaus began his introductory psychology text Outline of Psychology (1902) with this
famous statement (Hergenhahn, 2005).
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(p. 15). Then the story goes through the changes in psychological thought in past
centuries with some comments here and there about the mistakes past thinkers made
without ―empirical methods,‖ and quickly fast forwards to the end of the 19th century
when psychology started to emerge as a modern discipline.
From this point on, the previous fast-paced story-telling seems to enter a slow
motion mode, even to the degree of gazing.

In this linearly progressing history of

psychology, the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century was the
crucial moment for psychology to enter its ―present‖ from its ―long past.‖ And the most
crucial of all was the establishment of the experimental method.

The experimental

method was psychology‘s announcement that it had evolved from a brand of ―armchair‖
philosophy to a new discipline of empirical science based on ―laboratory‖ findings.
Wilhem Wundt‘s establishment of the first psychology laboratory in Leipzig, Germany
becomes the object of the historical gaze and the focus of the story because it is seen as
the event which stood for the birth of ―modern psychology.‖

As a consequence of this

landmark event in 1879, the history of psychology, this long and winding river which had
its origins in the Greek philosophers, started to change its directional flow.

After early

phases of structuralism, functionalism, and psychoanalysis, it gradually incorporated
streams from modern medicine and other natural sciences; and with the continuous
devotions of great minds, it eventually became the splendid scene of scientific
psychology in the United States.
This river-like, linear history of psychology was learned by most Taiwanese
psychologists in their training; maybe the emphasis or the details were slightly different,
but the core structure of the story stayed very much the same.
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Therefore, the historical

narrative that psychology ―originated in Europe but became great in the United States‖
becomes the history of psychology as identified by Taiwanese psychologists; most will
not cast a doubt on the truth value of the story, not to mention not knowing its
particularity and the problems thus involved.

The problem is that this biographical

history of modern psychology may not be as trustworthy as it is believed to be.
Early in 1966, when the history of psychology started to become a recognized
field in psychology,14 Cambridge scholar Robert M. Young wrote a long article
criticizing the low level of scholarly works in the field.

After reviewing a long list of

representative works in the field, he points out that most of them had not yet reached the
―useful but limited stage of amateurism‖ (p. 13) and therefore could not be qualified as
scholarly historical works.

He points out that it was ―unfortunately symptomatic‖ for

the history of psychology that it suffers from three limitations: ―great men,‖ ― great
insights,‖ and ―great dates‖ (p. 29), which as a result created historical works in the form
of an ―expository history.‖ Since most of the works in the history of psychology were
written by working psychologists for their colleagues or students, they naturally stress the
history of problems which reflect their current interest, and as Young points out, ―history
is thus written backwards from the viewpoint of a modern textbook‖ (p. 15).
argues that these pragmatic considerations generated significant problems.

Young
He points

out that this presentist approach had produced ―shockingly bad history,‖ and that it
―denies the student one of the most valuable helps to be gained from historical reading:
14

Institutionally, the American Psychological Association (APA) formally recognized the Division of the
History of Psychology in 1966, and many of the Division members were actively involved in the Journal of
the History of the Behavioral Sciences founded in 1965. Funding wise, not only the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) establish a History of the Life Sciences Study Section which made grants for research in the
study of the biological and related (including psychological) sciences, there were also funds for establishing
departments or institutes of the history of medicine and science and fellowships for potential teachers (R.
M. Young, 1966).
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perspectives‖ (p. 15).

Young also points out that, even though some works in the

history of psychology had started to refer to Thomas Kuhn‘s new historiography, there
was only ―scant evidence‖ that Kuhn‘s idea of ―understanding the past in its own term‖
was actually grasped by these works.

Young‘s article began the critique of the historical

narrative in the history of psychology.

However, it was not until the 1980s, when more

dialogue started to take place between the history of psychology and the history of
science, 15 that historians of psychology reconnected to the critique made by Young.
In his article ―Of What Is History of Psychology a History?‖ (1987) British
historian of psychology Graham Richards argues that the development of the history of
psychology needs to be critically examined.

He first points out that the early works in

the history of psychology were written by psychologists with a clear aim to provide a
―respectable genealogy‖ for the nascent discipline: they defended the legitimacy of
psychology by presenting psychology as ―the legitimate heir to the main western
philosophical tradition‖ (p. 201). The widely-accepted story that psychology
―originated in Europe but became great in the United States‖ was the historical product of
such a defense.

It provided a simple storyline which not only genealogically connected

the nascent discipline of psychology to the glorified European tradition but also stressed
the scientificity of psychology by emphasizing its experimental methods, which at the
time seemed to be a good enough defense for the legitimate status of psychology as a
young but respectable science.

He further argues that the efforts of the history of

psychology to emulate the history of science since the 1960s was nothing but a ―repeat

15

History of psychology became a salient field in the 1980s, especially toward the end of it. The
publication of several major works (Buss, 1979; Danziger, 1990; Leary, 1990; Rose, 1985) and the
establishment of a new journal named History of the Human Sciences (HHS) in 1988 contributed greatly
to active dialogues between the history of psychology and the history of other sciences.
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performance‖ of psychology‘s earlier striving to become a respected science (p. 203).
But this emulation is quite problematic because it assumes that psychology is not
different from the natural sciences and therefore the history of psychology should be
interpreted in the orthodox terms of the history of science.

And such an approach,

according to Richards, ―begs some central questions and prevents some genuinely
interesting and very important issues from being confronted‖ (p. 203).
Richards then points out one of the begged questions: there is a crucial difference
between psychology and the natural sciences, which is, that the widely used distinction
between ―internalist‖ and ―externalist‖ approaches to historiography does not really apply
to psychology because ―Psychology, the discipline, directly emerges out of ‗psychology‘
the subject matter‖ (p. 205); in other words, there is a reflexive relation between
psychology, the discipline, and psychology, the subject matter.

Richards suggests that

historians of psychology should admit that the scientific status of psychology is
problematic and this should be explored rather than defended by the history of
psychology.
In his article ―Does the History of Psychology Have a Subject?‖ (1988) historian
Roger Smith directly probes the core issue of the history of psychology: does the history
of psychology have a continuous subject as its subject matter? Smith‘s main points can
be summarized as follows: first, most works in the history of psychology accept highly
questionable notions of ―psychology,‖ their subject matter; and second, the history of
psychology as a disciplinary domain does not have a historically invariable ―psychology‖
as its corresponding subject.

Smith begins his arguments by first criticizing the

―textbook history‖ of psychology.

He argues that the linear history of psychology
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presented by most textbooks contributes to the ―normative framework‖ of the psychology
community and that such texts embody and transmit values important to psychologists‘
sense of worth and identity.

However, Smith also points out that this simplified version

of psychology‘s history is eventually dangerous to psychology itself.

First, this

simplified version of psychology‘s history is selective in nature, it ―privileges one body
of knowledge and practice as ‗truth‘, reducing the imagination‘s power to conceptualize
alternative truths‖ (p. 148).

Second, the linear history modern psychology presents is

essentially an oversimplified view of history: it ―distorts and simplifies what have been
far from inevitable events and circumstances‖ (p. 148).

And third, this historical

narrative presupposes that ―psychology‖ is a continuous subject but this presupposition is
exactly what should be explored by the practice of historical inquiry.
Using Foucault‘s general critique of the human sciences, Smith argues that
psychology‘s disciplinary existence consists of ―relations among bodies of knowledge
and forms of power‖ that can be traced to ―institutional, occupational, and personal
enactments,‖ and psychology as such is historically configured by these
power-knowledge relations, rather than by any pre-existing reality (p. 150).

Therefore,

instead of a presentist linear history, Smith proposes a ―present-centered‖ critical history
of psychology.

The present of psychology is still the main concern of this critical

history, but the present is neither a natural result of progress, nor is it a peak of
development; rather, it is a present made possible by historical contingencies.
From this critical stance, Smith points out that ―psychology‖ as a seemingly
continuous subject is in fact a narrative construction of textbook histories formed
selectively choosing to emphasize some part of psychological knowledge (for example,
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experimental psychology) and linking it with a particular historical tradition (for example,
the western philosophical tradition); however, what actually made ―psychology‖
historically recognizable was its ―social presence‖ since the generation of Wundt or
James (p. 154).

Therefore, the real subject of the history of psychology should be the

historical contingencies which made possible the emergence of psychology as such, and
the power-knowledge relations which sustain it.

The different ―faces‖ of psychology in

different societies is a result of those historical contingencies.

As Smith provocatively

points out, psychology was not ―one discipline‖ formed in ―one set of historical
circumstances‖; it is ―the ‗generic sign‘ of a cluster of competing would-be disciplines‖
(p. 156).
In the introduction to the special issue of History of the Human Sciences
published in 1991, the executive editor Kurt Danzier, who just published his major work
Constructing the Subject: Historical Origins of Psychological Research (1990),
responded, for the most part, positively to Smith‘s article.

He agreed with Smith that we

should by all means ―bury the ghost of the history of psychology,‖ but he nevertheless
argued that it does not mean the end of the disciplinary domain of the history of
psychology.

It means that a reappraisal is needed of psychology‘s appropriate subject

matter (p. 327).

Danziger concurs with Smith that psychology only recently became

historically identifiable as a ―social activity‖ and thus he proposed that ―the appearance
of psychology as a discipline‖ should be one anchoring point for historical studies.
Danziger argues that if the history of psychology is not to become the story about the
pursuit of timeless ―human nature,‖ it has to be grounded in ―the specific social activities‖
that constitute psychology as such.

He then points out that modern psychology since its
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inception has an inescapable feature of erecting universalistic knowledge-claims on a
rather localized social basis despite the fact that the discipline has multiple origins and
that its development has not been one of linear convergence.

Danziger argues that it is

only by ―privileging certain local developments over others‖ that psychology is able to
make such universal claims and speak of the history of psychology (pp. 327-328).

He

points out three factors which have contributed to the univocalization/universalization of
locally developed American psychology.

First, the internal politics of the discipline:

History has been used by psychologists such as Boring (1950) to place their particular
version of the disciplinary project at the central position.

Second, psychology as a

discipline has been unequally developed in different nations, and American psychology
has surpassed that of other nations both in quality and quantity.

Third, the uneven

development of psychology made it easier to structure the history of the discipline in
terms of a continuous and progressively developing subject.

As a result, this linear

history marginalized trends, both local and international, that did not fit the perspective of
mainstream American psychology and played down the pervasiveness and significance of
fundamental disagreements.

However, as psychology in other places grew rapidly in

recent years, the American-centered history of psychology has become less convincing as
representing the history of psychology.

Danziger therefore proposes a ―polycentric

historiography‖ to replace the old historiography which not only positions American
psychology at the geographical center, but also positions a particular brand of it
(empirical, experimental mainstream psychology) at the conceptual core of the discipline.
Besides the proposal of a new polycentric historiography, in ―Does the History of
Psychology Have a Future‖ (1994), Danziger further proposes that psychology is in need
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of a critical history.

He first examines two opposite models of institutionalizing

disciplinary history: one represented by physics which institutionally separates the study
of its history from the disciplinary practice, and the other represented by economics in
which the study of its own history is an integral part of the disciplinary practice.

By

comparing these two opposite models, Danziger argues that the natural sciences and the
human sciences have very different ways of ―mobilizing tradition,‖ and therefore they
have different kinds of historical ―sensibilities‖ (pp. 468-472). The natural sciences are
largely consensus enterprises, they usually mobilize tradition by a brief account of the
recent relevant research literature to demarcate a sphere of uncertainty and ignorance
within predefined research areas, and this small piece of recent relevant historical past is
presented in the ―literature review‖ section of a study.

On the other hand, the human

sciences are often divided by alternative schools of thought which tend not to agree with
each other, and therefore, their way of mobilizing tradition usually involves ―critical
historiography‖ (p. 471) with considerable chronological depth so that the differences
among schools can be seen with maximum visibility.

The ―shallow history‖ (p. 471) of

research papers does help the natural sciences maximize consensus around the formation
of what is already known and what is still uncertain.

However, the efficiency of

problem solving comes at a price: the natural sciences institutionalize a ―lack of reflective
historical consciousness‖ (p. 471); they ―progress‖ in a way as if science were beyond
history.
Danziger points out that in terms of their research practice, most experimental
psychologists mobilize tradition in a way similar to that of physicists; therefore, there is
hardly any room in their world for a reflective or critical history (p. 472).
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One could

even argue that there was perhaps no need for a critical history, since after World War II
the American model was the one to be emulated rather than criticized.

The historical

narrative that psychology ―originated in Europe but became great in the United States‖
provided the necessary sense of identity and pride for American psychologists, and they
just had to focus on what they were doing and the ―shallow history‖ that could help them
clarify their research questions was all they needed.
in the mid-1970s.

However, things started to change

With the recovery of European psychology, the American model of

―behavioral science‖ was no longer the only game in town, and the American-centered
historical narrative was also contested.

And externally, as the scientific advance started

to show its negative impacts, the general public became skeptical about the supposedly
transcendental claims made by science.

There was even the glimmer of a suspicion that

science is not beyond history; science is a social activity and, like other social activities,
it is historical in nature.

Critical histories of science started to emerge as a response to

the fall of scientism, which in many ways inspired critical historical studies of
psychology to question its natural science model.

In addition, the ―human geography‖

of psychology also started to change; psychology‘s Others started to enter the field and
they were not satisfied with the status quo.

And along with the end of American

hegemony in psychology, both the old discipline hierarchy of placing the ―hard-core
experimentalists‖ at the top and the old historiography of placing the Euro-Americans at
the center were challenged from within and without American psychology.

The old

historiography has lost its appeal and the shallow history was never a genuine history;
Danziger therefore proposed that psychology was in need of a different kind of historical
consciousness in order to deal with the complexity of its current affairs. As Danziger says,
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it is ―when the authority becomes questionable, when the professional community is
divided in some profound way, that a critical disciplinary history has a significant
contribution to make‖ (p. 478).
Danziger argues that there are at least three ways a critical historiography might
have an effect on psychology.

First, the discipline of psychology has traditionally

defined its subject matter in ahistorical terms, that is to say, as human ―nature.‖ But as
we already know, human subjectivity is not a thing-like object; it is historically and
locally configured.

Critical studies‘ interest in the historicity of human subjectivity and

its conceptions therefore should have a legitimate place in the discipline of psychology.
Second, the historicization of human subjectivity forces the discipline to reexamine, and
eventually historicize, its ahistorical investigative practices.

And as Danziger comments,

this might help the discipline of psychology to finally realize that ―psychology‘s
investigative practices are historically contingent products reflecting a limited set of
knowledge interests‖ (p. 480) and break up its ―methodological gridlock,‖ its obsession
with quantifying methodology.

Third, the discipline of psychology was given high

hopes at its birth, but has failed to participate in the major currents of intellectual
discourse in the 20th century.

By gathering historical depth in theoretical discussions,

Danziger expects a change in the social contribution of psychology.
On the basis of the arguments reviewed above, we can assert that the history of
psychology that has been taken for granted by the majority of Taiwanese psychologists is
itself quite problematic.

This historical narrative, that psychology ―originated in Europe

but became great in the United States,‖ presupposes that history progresses in a linear
fashion as if history is a homogeneous temporal-spatial duration.
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Instead we can

propose that it was actually an oversimplified historical narrative constructed by elite
psychologists not only to defend the problematic scientific status of psychology, but also
to place their specific disciplinary agenda at the center of psychology.

While this

historical narrative did provide American psychologists with a sense of identity and
worth, it also came at a price; it privileged a certain trend of psychology (the
experimental tradition) and its practice as the ―hardcore‖ of psychology, and
marginalized or ignored other trends of psychology and other systems of psychology.
For example, in almost all psychology textbooks, psychoanalysis is dealt with in the ―past
tense‖ as if it were irrelevant in the contemporary context, which we know is far from an
accurate depiction.

Other trends which do not share the same perspective or

philosophical ground with the mainstream, such as phenomenological psychology, are
hardly mentioned in this grand narrative.
As for psychology in other places in the world, Brock (2006) summarizes the
rules of inclusion/exclusion rather nicely:
Rule #1: If your work did not have a major impact on American psychology,
however influential it might have been elsewhere, it does not count.
Rule #2: If your work had a major impact on American psychology, even though its
influence was limited or nonexistent elsewhere, it is an important part of the history
of psychology.
Rule #3: Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Oceania do not exist. (pp. 3-4)
That is to say, whether psychology from other places in the world will show up in this
grand narrative really depends on its impact on mainstream American psychology.

This

grand narrative cannot ignore Europe, because it is considered to be the birthplace of
psychology; but other systems of psychology which did not play a role in the formation
of American psychology can simply be ignored and considered as nonexistent.
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What is ironic is that most Taiwanese psychologists consider this historical
narrative, which in principle excludes their contributions, as the history of psychology.
But what is more bewildering is that, even those who advocate for an indigenous
psychology also embrace this historical narrative almost without a doubt.

It seems that

the abovementioned lessons from the history of psychology have not been learned by
Taiwanese psychologists; they identify with a history without knowing that they are the
Others of this history, and still strive to be recognized by this very history that ignores
their legitimate existence.

From a History of Psychology to the History of Psychology
Do you feel that your own people and country are somehow always
positioned outside the mainstream? Have you ever felt that the moment
you said the word ‗I‘, that ‗I‘ was someone else, not you? That in some
obscure way, you were not the subject of your own sentence? Do you
ever feel that whenever you speak, you have already in some sense been
spoken for? Or that when you hear others speaking, that you are only
ever going to be the object of their speech? Do you sense that those
speaking would never think of trying to find out how things seem to you,
from where you are? That you live in a world of others, a world that
exists for others? (R. Young, 2003, p. 1)
This misrecognition of the historical narrative constructed by mainstream
American psychologists as the history of psychology has to be first explicated historically
in a global context.

If we look back to the early phase of the discipline of psychology at

the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, not only was psychology
practiced in many nations (for example, Wundt‘s lab experiments in Leipzig, Charcot‘s
psychopathology research in Paris, Galton‘s psychometric studies in London), it was also
heading toward divergence rather than convergence.

There were frequent international

exchanges but at the same time the discipline exhibited a ―profound localism‖ (Danziger,
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2006).

In other words, in its early phase the discipline of psychology in the

Euro-American world was a polycentric practice in which psychology showed a different
―flavor‖ in different localities and none of these ―flavors‖ was easily transplantable.
As for the development of the discipline of psychology in Asia, according to
Turtle (1989), modern psychology appeared in Asia very early on in history, 16 and its
advent and development coincided with the decline of the old colonial regime in Asia.
However, due to linguistic barriers, economic poverty, and mostly, the difference
between modern psychology and the local social-cultural matrices, the development of
the discipline in Asian countries had been rather difficult and stayed in a kind of
apprenticeship to European and American psychology for decades.

According to

Turtle‘s (1989) observation, it was not until the 1970s that psychology in Asia overall
showed more signs of maturity.
The eruption of World War II changed everything.

Since Europe was one of the

main battlegrounds, many European cities and academic institutions were either wrecked
or threatened by ground battles or airstrikes.
governmental budgets.

Financing the war put a heavy burden on

Most war-unrelated academic activities, including that of

psychology, were either forced to stop completely or survive in a rather resourceless
condition.

Thing were not better in Asia.

Those countries which had psychological

institutions established before World War II such as China, India, and Japan all took part
in the Pacific War, either voluntarily or involuntarily.

The development of psychology

in these countries was seriously hindered by the war, if not completely stopped by it
(Blowers, 2006; Turtle, 1989).

On the other hand, the United States was barely touched

16

India established its first psychological institution in 1916, China in 1920, and Japan established its first
psychology lab in 1903.
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by the war and it benefited greatly from being the supplier of war necessities.

Therefore,

neither the institutions nor the academic activities of American psychology were
threatened by the war; on the contrary, American psychologists‘ active participation in
wartime affairs and especially the psychology community‘s affiliation with the military
establishment actually broadened the base of psychology‘s social support and helped
change psychologists‘ role in American society from a more academic role to a more
socially involved role (Evans, Sexton, & Cadwallader, 1992).

Overall, American

psychology became more active and powerful than ever during and after World War II.
In comparison to its pre-war condition, postwar psychology was a completely
different scene.

American psychologists had demonstrated to the government and to the

general public that their expertise could be of great use during the war, and they were
determined to market their expertise more widely with the help of the newly reformed
and more activist-oriented American Psychological Association (Evans et al., 1992).

As

Pickren and others (Buchanan, 2003; Pickren, 2005, 2007) point out, World War II and
the changed conditions of postwar American life resulted in rapid expansion in every area
of psychology, and created the need for a great number of professional psychologists.
American psychology was no longer the dubious science that had to defend itself, but had
become a rapidly expanding industry.
As American psychology became stronger than ever, the once active European
psychology went into postwar depression and Asian psychology‘s way toward maturity
was still seriously hindered by postwar regional unrest.

Overall, there was no

psychology in any other nation that had the scale, funding, and social support comparable
to that of American psychology.

Under such conditions of uneven development,
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European psychology soon became the importer of, or ―colonized‖ by American
psychology despite the rich local traditions that developed in various nations before the
war (van Strien, 1997).

In the case of Asia, psychology began to show a much stronger

presence in Asian countries as part of American influence.

With American support,

many countries started to establish psychology departments or institutions, and those
which already had psychological institutions shifted their allegiance from European
psychology to American psychology (Turtle, 1989).

The United States became the

major exporter of psychology and psychological education after World War II.
Therefore, in its postwar development, psychology also became profoundly
Americanized.

As a result, these postwar changes created ―a pattern of international

exchange of psychological knowledge‖ in which the exchange of knowledge was
essentially asymmetrical: from the center (the United States) to peripheries (non-US
nations), and rarely the other way around (Danziger, 2006). In this center-periphery
scheme, American psychology could basically ignore other psychologies and make
universal knowledge-claims without hesitation while other psychologies could not afford
to ignore American psychology without the status of their knowledge-claims being
questioned.

The center-periphery scheme profoundly shaped the global landscape of

psychology after World War II, and in many ways it is still the dominating structure
within psychology, probably less effectively so in Europe or other places where they have
found ways to enrich psychology with their own traditions.
In the Taiwanese context, the history is even more complicated than the global
context just described.

Although it is commonly believed that the establishment of the

Psychology Department of NTU in 1949 marked the beginning of modern psychology in
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Taiwan, this story of origin actually covered up the historical fact that modern
psychology made its first appearance in Taiwan during the period of Japanese colonial
rule.

The Institute of Psychology specializing in the study of Taiwanese aborigines was

established at Taihoku Imperial University in 1928 as one of the Japanese Empire‘s
Southeast Asian research bases. 17

However, after World War II, all the faculty members

and students of the Institute of Psychology left Taiwan and went back to Japan.
clear whether they were forced to leave or left voluntarily.

It is not

But in terms of the nature of

the Institute‘s psychological practice, there seemed to be no reason for them to stay after
the war since most of the Institute‘s activities involved the assistance of the Japanese
colonial government‘s administration of the Taiwanese aborigines, which was hardly one
of the urgent administrative concerns of the new government.
The reemergence of psychology in Taiwan after World War II was actually based
on the legacy left by psychological practice during colonial rule.

The legacy was not in

the form of teaching or training, but in the form of material resources (research papers,
books, and experimental instruments) left by the Institute of Psychology.

These

material resources were accidentally discovered by Thome H. Fang, then chair of the
Department of Philosophy, and he assigned Xiang-Yu Su, a faculty member of the
Department of Philosophy who had three years of psychological training at Tokyo
Imperial University, to take charge of establishing a new psychology department.

The

Department of Psychology was eventually established in 1949, and the department‘s
17

Taihoku Imperial University was founded in 1928 by the Japanese colonial government in Taiwan, and
it was the second Imperial University founded overseas in Japanese colonies (the first one being Keijo
Imperial University founded in 1924 in Korea). The founding of these two overseas Imperial Universities
was part of the strategic deployment in the Japanese Empire‘s expansion plan: Keijo Imperial University
served as the academic base for the Northern Advancement Policy in which China was targeted, and
Taihoku Imperial University served as the academic base for the Southern Advancement Policy in which
Southeast Asia was targeted. After World War II, Taihoku Imperial University was reformed and
renamed National Taiwan University by the government of the Republic of China in 1945.
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mission was to develop psychology as a theoretical and practical science which could
help facilitate the well-being of people and make positive contributions to society
(Chuang et al., 1999). Therefore, if the establishment of the Department of Psychology
at NTU in 1949 is to be considered a significant event, the real significance was that it
marked the transition of the disciplinary practice of psychology in Taiwan; the nature of
the psychological practice in Taiwan had changed from a colonial science in the service
of the Japanese Empire‘s Southern Advancement Policy (Yeh, 2010), to a normative
science expected to contribute to the welfare of a troubled nation (Chuang et al., 1999).
The above history shows that the history of Taiwanese psychology actually
consists of two earlier histories.

One belongs to Japanese psychology in the colonial

context in which studies of folk psychology were conducted with Taiwanese aborigines
so that they could be properly managed (Wu, 2007).

The other one belongs to Chinese

psychology which adopted the discipline of psychology as part of the ―package deal‖ of
Western modernity, and whose development in mainland China had been seriously
interrupted by seemingly endless wars (Blowers, 2006). These two histories briefly
overlapped in Taiwan after World War II and were the forces that gave birth to a new
history of psychology impregnated in a different geopolitical context.

At this new

historical stage, the main factor that shaped Taiwanese psychology‘s development was
the ―American factor‖: by ways of financial support, book donations to university
libraries, and scholarships/fellowships offered, the United States quickly changed the
postwar landscape of psychology in Taiwan.
The faculty members in the Department of Psychology at NTU were first
generation Chinese psychologists who were mostly educated in Japan in the tradition of
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German psychology.

One of them, Fa-Yu Chen, continued the study of Taiwanese

aborigines for a short while in the direction of the research done by the Institute of
Psychology in the colonial period (F.-Y. Chen, 1952a, 1952b; Cheng, Chen, Rin, &
Chang, 1958).

When they started their teaching careers in Taiwan, these first generation

Chinese psychologists were confronted with a different landscape of psychology in which
Germany psychology had declined and American psychology had become
overwhelmingly hegemonic.

They were forced to teach and research in the unfamiliar

tradition of American psychology which seemed at the time to be the only model for
psychology.

Even though some of them might have expected to go back to China, the

Chinese civil War between the Kuomintang (KMT; also referred to as the Chinese
Nationalist Party) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) prevented such a return.
Instead the KMT and more than a million Chinese people retreated to Taiwan and
reestablished the government of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan, while the CPC
took control of mainland China, formed a new government, and declared the founding of
the People‘s Republic of China (PROC) in 1949.

These Chinese psychologists

eventually stayed and continued their professional careers in Taiwan.

The turbulent

China in which their profession began was a world away18 and they no longer belonged
to the history of Chinese psychology after 1949. Instead, in a geopolitically
anti-communist and pro-American Taiwan, they became pioneering figures in the
postwar history of Taiwanese psychology.
18

After the retreat in 1949, the KMT government strictly prohibited any form of communication between
Taiwan and China out of fear of communist infiltration. Any communication between Taiwan and China
had to be done cautiously and indirectly (mostly through Hong-Kong) otherwise one was at risk of
breaking the martial law declared in 1949. The Taiwanese government eventually lifted martial law in
1987 and allowed the Taiwanese to visit China in 1988; however, nearly forty years of separation and the
never ending negative propaganda against each other during this time had created an overall sense of deep
mistrust between the Taiwanese people and the people of China.
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In terms of professional development, the next generation of Taiwanese
psychologists was luckier than the first generation Chinese psychologists whose
professional careers were seriously hindered by war.

This next generation was able to

pursue their professional careers in a relatively stable environment sustained by the
coercion of the KMT government.

Most of early students who graduated from the

Department of Psychology at NTU pursued diverse career paths, but some outstanding
alumni were hired by the department as lecturers to share the teaching load of faculty
members.

These young lecturers were teaching newly published American textbooks

that they themselves were learning at the same time (Chuang et al., 1999).

After several

years of teaching, these eager young lecturers were encouraged by the department to go
overseas to the United States for graduate studies with scholarships offered by the United
States or the Taiwanese government, and they later became the first generation of
postwar American-trained Taiwanese psychologists.

The three venerable professors

invited to be the keynote speakers of TPA‘s 48th annual meeting were the first among
them.

Because their years of self-learning and graduate education were all in the

tradition of American psychology, when they returned to teach in the department, they
passionately pushed for curriculum reform based on the American model.

The reform

of the curriculum further Americanized the disciplinary training and practice of
Taiwanese psychology.

With the extensive use of American textbooks, the historical

narrative constructed by mainstream American psychologists became the first historical
perspective of the students of psychology in Taiwan.
Due to the relatively small academic publishing market, both Taiwanese
psychologists and publishers were discouraged to publish textbooks authored by
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Taiwanese psychologists.

Even if they did publish such work, it was soon replaced by

American textbooks which updated relevant materials with amazing speed.

In such a

difficult publishing environment, one could hardly expect Taiwanese psychologists to
formulate their own historical perspectives through the gradual process of authoring
psychology textbooks. Therefore, psychology students in Taiwan mainly acquired their
perspective on the history of psychology through textbooks authored by mainstream
American psychologists, translated or not.

Furthermore, since the textbooks used in

many different courses were not that different in terms of their historical perspectives, the
same historical narrative was repeated in different courses and thus essentially acquired
the status of common knowledge among Taiwanese psychology students.

And lastly,

since the historical narrative constructed by mainstream American psychologists
presupposed a presentist stance that history progresses in a linear fashion, the historical
past was summoned to justify the status quo and to guarantee the future of that status quo.
Therefore, Taiwanese psychologists and their students who were ―brainwashed‖
by this historical narrative did not find it necessary to investigate the historical past.
They were more inclined to spent time catching up with ―current developments‖ or
―groundbreaking discoveries‖ in American psychology.

Consequentially, they remained

quite ignorant of other non-mainstream historical perspectives, and the debates over the
historiography of psychology never seemed to enter their intellectual horizons.

Without

the challenge from other historical perspectives or from critical reflection on the
power-knowledge relations involved in the construction of textbook histories, the
American-centered history eventually became the history of psychology for Taiwanese
psychologists and their students.

By being exposed to this historical narrative over and
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over again, they became deeply convinced that mainstream American psychology
represented the present and future of psychology, and that therefore it was the psychology
on which Taiwanese psychology should be modeled.

A History Misidentified and Misappropriated
We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters
between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indians
in blood and color, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals, and in
intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects
of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed
from the Western nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fit vehicles
for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the population. (By Thomas
Babington Macaulay in "Minutes on Indian Education," as cited in Spivak,
1999, p. 268)
When people tell personal stories about themselves, they are not simply
describing a past that is fixed and gone but re-membering their past in the narrative they
tell.

Some events in their lives are emphasized, and some are ignored; they can tell

upbeat stories about themselves, or they can tell depressing ones.

Therefore, the stories

they tell about themselves are not simply about their past; these stories also reflect how
they conceive of their present and imagine their futures.

Analogously, the historical

narrative constructed by mainstream American psychologists is not simply a description
of the historical facts, but a selective re-membering of the past which reflects how the
present of psychology is conceived of, how the future is imagined, how changes are
evaluated, and so on.

That is to say, this particular historical narrative reflects

mainstream American psychologists‘ historical conception of the discipline of
psychology; it is essentially a temporal framework employed to determine the relative
positioning of different trends of psychological knowledge, and evaluations of these
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different trends are already implied in the act of determining their relative positioning
(which trends should be placed at the core?

Which trends should be seen as belonging

to the past? Which trends should be seen as belonging to the future?).
For example, the thinking and practice of psychoanalysis are very much alive in
many parts of the world.

Psychoanalysis continues to exist not only as a therapeutic

practice, but it has already had a great deal of influence in many areas in the human
sciences such as literature studies and cultural studies.

Even the ―hardcore sciences‖

such as neuroscience are reevaluating psychoanalytic theories in light of the new
discoveries in the field (Mancia, 2006).

However, many Taiwanese psychologists tend

to talk about psychoanalysis as if it belongs to the unscientific past of psychology, and
this prejudiced attitude toward psychoanalysis is likely due to the historical narrative they
have learned which positions psychoanalysis as one of the three now surpassed early
schools in the history of psychology.

Similarly, the paradigm shifts that occurred in the

American context (for example, the fall of behaviorism and the rise of cognitive
psychology) or the rise of certain psychological trends in the United States (for example,
the recent rise of neuropsychology and the extensive use of functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) in studying psychological functioning in terms of brain
activities) are often taken out of the context by Taiwanese psychologists as universal
trends with which Taiwanese psychology should try to keep up.
Taiwanese psychology‘s misrecognition of the historical narrative constructed by
mainstream American psychologists as the history of psychology has become
problematic in many ways.

First, as a discipline locally practiced in Taiwan, Taiwanese

psychology has overall developed a paradoxical sense of historical consciousness.
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Taiwanese psychologists care and know about the development of psychology in the
United States, but are relatively indifferent to, and ignorant of, the historical and present
development of psychology in Taiwan.

And one can even say that Taiwanese

psychologists to a great extent identify with the history of mainstream American
psychology as if it were their own history, and try their best to be part of this glorified
history.

If their research is recognized by mainstream American psychology and cited

in textbooks, most Taiwanese psychologists will consider it to be a great honor because
they are now ―internationally‖ recognized.

In comparison to ―international‖ recognition,

whether their research is locally relevant or not is a relatively minor concern to them.
Second, since almost all the significant events and theoretical innovations in the
history of psychology took place in the United States, rather than locally in Taiwan, the
local practice of psychology in Taiwan appears to be less significant and less advanced in
comparison to the practice of psychology in the United States.

For many Taiwanese

psychologists, the sheer quantity and diversity of psychological publications in the United
States is convincing enough evidence of the significance and advancement of American
psychology.

This implicit presupposition of the significance and advancement of

American psychology automatically places Taiwanese psychology in a marginalized and
inferior position.

It therefore becomes ―self-evident‖ to Taiwanese psychologists that

the main task of Taiwanese psychology is to ―catch up‖ with the development of
American psychology.

As a result, psychological practice in Taiwan has been mostly

driven by a kind of inferiority complex originating in an implicit reference to mainstream
American psychology, rather than by the reflexive relation between the disciplinary
practice of psychology and the psychological life of the local community.
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And as

Richards (1987) says, this reflexive relation is crucially important to the relevance and
worth of the disciplinary practice of psychology with regard to the concerns of the local
community to which it belongs:
Psychology, the discipline, directly emerges out of ‗psychology‘ the
subject matter. The success of a psychological theory might well be
determined by such factors as whether people ‗see themselves‘ in it,
whether the view of life contained in it corresponds to everyone else‘s less
articulated feelings and perceptions, whether, in short, it meets the needs
which people at the time wish psychological theories to meet. (pp.
205-206)
However, in the case of Taiwanese psychology, the reflexive relation between the
disciplinary practice and the psychological life of the local community has been greatly
disturbed by Taiwanese psychology‘s envious relation with American psychology.

As a

result, rather than being a reflexive practice integral to the psychological life of its local
community, the practice of psychology in Taiwan has instead become estranged from its
local community.
Taiwanese psychologists‘ misrecognition/misappropriation of the historical
narrative constructed by mainstream American psychologists is actually part of the local
consequence of the postwar American hegemony within the discipline of psychology.
In the American dominated center-periphery scheme, mainstream American psychology
becomes idealized in peripheral areas like Taiwan; its history becomes the history of
psychology, its psychological categories become ―natural‖ categories, and its values and
knowledge criteria become the universal standards that psychology in peripheral areas
should follow.
Unlike the human child‘s identification with the gestalt image of the ―ideal-I‖
discussed in Lacan‘s (2006) article on the mirror stage in which the child‘s playful
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experience with his own image in the reflected environment helps to establish a
relationship between the child and its environment, identification with this idealized
mainstream American psychology actually becomes a threat to the autonomy of
psychological practice in peripheral areas such as Taiwan.

It not only offers a fictional

history which covers up the genuine historical trajectories of peripheral psychologies, but
it also disturbs the functioning of psychology as a reflexive practice and estranges
psychological practices in peripheral areas from their local community.

It is only by

critically historicizing the history of psychology that we are able to see how this history
has been misrecognized and misappropriated by psychologists at the margins, and how
the identification with the idealized mainstream American psychology has led
psychologists at the margins astray from the possibility of having a genuine indigenous
psychology.

History does matter, and it has to be re-membered.

Yet, everything considered, the non-Western world cannot disown its
cultural self entirely, even it wants to do so. Its version of the oculus
mundi cannot be other than inauthentic and occasionally comic. In that
inauthenticity and comicality there is always another play that is
possible—there is always the possibility of a failure to live up to the
expectation of the West. The play and the failure offer a small way out
for the non-West from an otherwise totalizing situation. (Sardar et al.,
1993, p. 87)
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Chapter 4
Indigenous Psychology: A History Forgotten and Remembered
The most serious blow suffered by the colonized is being removed from
history and from the community....He is in no way a subject of history any
more. Of course, he carries its burden, often more cruelly than others,
but always as an object. (Memmi, 1957/1991)
As pointed out in chapter 2, the blinded gaze of Europe‘s eye of the world
involves a ―perversion of reality‖ in which the imaginary dimension of the European
psyche ―fleshed out‖ and became dominant in Europe‘s relation with Others.

A similar

―perversion of reality‖ also happened to non-European Others when they encountered the
overwhelming power of the West.

Non-European Others became narcissistically

attached to the idealized West and thus alienated from their own traditions and even from
their own histories.

This identification with the idealized West is often considered to

constitute progress in the modernization of non-European societies.

As demonstrated in

chapter 3, Taiwanese psychologists‘ misrecognition and misappropriation of the history
of psychology is a symptomatic aspect of their identification with the idealized
mainstream American psychology.
The emergence of the indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan was initially a
―wakeup call‖ to Taiwanese psychologists‘ problematic relation to an idealized
mainstream American psychology.

Or in Kuo-Shu Yang‘s words, it was a wakeup call

to the fact that he had been thoroughly ―brainwashed‖ by mainstream American
psychology and became an ―almost 100 percent Westernized psychologist‖ (Yang, 1997,
p. 63).

However, this moment of clarity was once again covered up by the history of

psychology and the wakeup call to the problematic relation with idealized mainstream
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American psychology was misappropriated by Yang as part of the ―cultural revolution‖
in the history of psychology (Yang, 2005, p. 3). What Yang, as well as other indigenous
psychologists, did not realize was that history was also part of the ―brainwashing‖ and
therefore should not be accepted as is but critically reexamined.

That is to say, the

history of psychology has to be critically historicized so as to disrupt its power to idealize
mainstream American psychology.

This is only the first step. In order for Taiwanese

psychology to become a genuine indigenous psychology—that is, a social practice
grounded in the reflexive relation with its local community rather than driven by
identification with idealized mainstream American psychology—the marginalized and
thus forgotten historical trajectory of Taiwanese psychology has to be re-membered by
way of critical historiography.

Psychology‘s Journey to the East
Psychology was first introduced to Chinese-speaking societies19 at the end of the
19th century.

Sciences and technologies from 19th century Europe had demonstrated

their practical value or even ―magical‖ power—for example, in the production of the
mighty weaponry used by Western colonial powers to force the late Qing government
into trading on unequal terms, or in the scientific experiments performed by Western
missionaries for the general public in order to coerce them into religious conversion (Luo,
19

The term huaren shehui 華人社會 often refers to Taiwan, Hong-Kong, and China in which the majority
of the population are ethnic Chinese. Depending on whether the emphasis is on ethnicity or on language,
it is either translated as ―ethnic-Chinese societies‖ or as ―Chinese-speaking societies.‖ With its emphasis
on the shared linguistic heritage, ―Chinese-speaking societies,‖ is the preferred translation for the
following reasons: first, the adaptation of psychology to the Chinese-speaking world is essentially a
―translingual practice‖ (Liu, 1995) in which language is the very battleground of colonization and as well
as of decolonization. Second, the histories of the three societies (including that of psychology) are in
many ways related, if not entangled; decolonization will therefore be most effective as a joint effort of the
three. Acknowledging the shared linguistic heritage is the first step toward such an effort.
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1996)—as the desirable ―Western technological knowledge‖ (yiji 夷技) that Chinese
people had to acquire so as to defend themselves against colonial ambitions.
Psychology, in contrast, had never in any way ―proven‖ itself to be useful or even
necessary at all when it was first introduced to this part of the world.

In fact,

psychology was such a foreign form of knowledge that the early translators of
psychology texts had to choose Chinese characters not previously conjoined just to
translate the basic terms such as ―mind‖ and ―psychology‖ into Chinese, not to mention
the difficulties involved in translating other major conceptual building blocks of which
the edifice of psychology is composed (Blowers, 2006; Kao, 2009).
Psychology has come a long way in Taiwan and other Chinese societies since its
introduction to the Chinese-speaking world.

Psychology seems to have successfully

established itself as a respected science in which the authority of psychological
knowledge is prescribed, and more recently as a licensed clinical profession in Taiwan to
which the responsibility for treating mentally-disturbed patients is entrusted. There is
no doubt that psychology has already gained a foothold and will continue to flourish in
Taiwan and other Chinese-speaking societies.

And indeed, most psychologists consider

psychology‘s current establishment and its continuous development in Chinese-speaking
societies a story of progress, as psychology‘s successful ―journey to the East,‖ so to
speak.
However, the apparent success of psychology in Chinese-speaking societies
should not prevent us from probing important but often ignored questions.

The most

puzzling one among them regarding the introduction of psychology to the
Chinese-speaking world is the question regarding ―why.‖
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As evinced by the difficulties

encountered by the early translators of psychology texts, there seemed to be a huge
cultural-linguistic barrier that needed to be overcome.

Furthermore, the early translators,

such as Yan Yongjing and Wang Guowei, must have been aware that psychology was a
rather young science compared to the longstanding Chinese intellectual tradition of the
study of the heart (xin 心) in which traditional Chinese intellectuals (shiren 士人) used
to take much pride.

Why was psychology introduced in the first place? This question

opens up a whole range of other questions regarding the historical conditions of the
introduction of psychology to the Chinese-speaking world.
―Psychology‖ in Western sense of the term was introduced to the
Chinese-speaking world in the context of missionary activities in coastal Chinese cities.
The neologism ―xinlingxue 心靈學‖ (mind-spirit study) was coined by Yan Yongjing
(1838-1898) as the corresponding Chinese term for ―psychology‖ in his translation of
American clergyman Joseph Haven‘s Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect,
Sensibilities, and Will (1859).

Yan was educated in a Christian school at Shanghai and

later went to the United States for higher education in the 1850s.

Haven‘s Mental

Philosophy was used extensively as a school textbook during this time, and Yan found
Haven‘s approach to mental philosophy (or psychology) essential to the understanding of
human nature (Kao, 2009).

Yan returned to China in 1862, a year after he graduated

with honors from Kenyon College in Ohio, and went back to Shanghai to help found St.
John‘s College in 1879 in which he served as the dean and was a lecturer in several
courses.

Yan decided to translate Haven‘s Mental Philosophy as a textbook for the

philosophy course he taught.

However, as a translator, Yan found himself in a difficult
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position and was compelled to invent neologisms so as to introduce the ideas of
psychology to the Chinese-speaking world.
The Chinese character xin 心 (heart) was originally a pictographic representation
of the heart which in the Chinese intellectual tradition refers to the master (zhu 主) of the
five essential organs (wuzang 五臟) of the human body.

Heart as an ―organ‖ in this

context should not be taken in the Western anatomical sense.
essential to human existence.

It is a functional center

The body-mind dichotomy does not really apply here.

Xin not only refers to the visible organ located in the chest, it also refers to the invisible
psychological or spiritual functions attributed to it.

The study of xin (heart) is, therefore,

not only a matter of medicine, but also a matter of moral-spiritual cultivation (xiuyang 修
養) in the Chinese intellectual tradition.

Yan‘s translation did introduce a new science

of the mind to the Chinese-speaking world, but the introduction of this new science was
neither to break away from nor to replace the longstanding Chinese intellectual tradition
of the study of xin (heart).

As Blowers (2006) points out, the introduction of

psychology, like many other Western texts translated at the time, was seen as ―an aid to
moral guidance‖ (p. 96) which at the time was part of Chinese intellectuals‘ strategic use
of Western knowledge (xixue 西學) to enhance ―self-strengthening‖ (ziqiang 自強).
Yan‘s decision to coin ―psychology‖ as xinlingxue 心靈學 was probably an attempt to
bridge the Christian religious/spiritual (ling 靈) tradition with the Chinese tradition of the
study of xin (heart).
The idea of ―self-strengthening‖ through the strategic use of Western knowledge
was not merely an individualistic attempt on the part of Chinese intellectuals.

In fact, it

became a policy of the Qing government after the humiliating defeat of the Second
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Opium War (1856-1860) by the British Empire and the Second French Empire.

The

Self-Strengthening Movement (ziqiang yundong 自強運動; 1861-1895) involved a broad
range of institutional reforms which included modernizing the military, establishing a
new office in charge of foreign affairs, building schools specialized in the training of
scientific, technological, and diplomatic personnel, sending out young students overseas
to learn Western knowledge, and building industrial and communication infrastructures.
The main goal of the movement was to make China a stronger and wealthier Empire in
order to defend itself against the ambitions of Western colonial powers.

To a great

extent, the Self-Strengthening Movement was an institutional reflection of the ti-yong 體
用 principle endorsed by Chinese intellectuals at the time.

The introduction of Western

knowledge should be based on its utility (yong 用) and should not threaten the essence (ti
體) of the Chinese intellectual tradition (Luo, 1998).

The defeat of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) by the Japanese Empire
practically ended the Self-Strengthening Movement of the Qing government.

Most

Chinese intellectuals were shocked and humiliated by the fact that the Qing Empire was
defeated by its recently modernized tribute state.20

For Chinese intellectuals, it was an

indication that the mild reform of the Qing government was a total failure.

Some of

them still had hope for a second reform but many were radicalized and yearned for a
political revolution (Luo, 2007).

Nevertheless, both the conservatives and the would-be

revolutionists agreed that the Chinese intellectual tradition should no longer be seen as
20

The tribute system (chaogong tixi 朝貢體系) was Imperial China‘s major framework for dealing with
foreign affairs. Foreign countries affirmed the authority of Imperial China by paying tribute to the
Emperor, and in return the Emperor granted trading privileges to those tribute-paying countries. The
tribute system was an organic part of Imperial China‘s world order. However, starting from the end of the
18th century, the Imperial China‘s world order was gradually eroded by the expansion of European power
into the Asia-Pacific region. The humiliating defeat of the First Sino-Japanese War marked the historical
transition of regional power from China to Japan.
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the essence of Chinese civilization but rather as the representation of the old China that
needed to be radically revamped.
It was in this radical sentiment that ―the West‖ became no longer a mere
geographical term but a psychological category.

Chinese intellectuals started to idealize

the West (zunxi 尊西) and pushed for a more radical educational reform which prioritized
the learning and teaching of Western knowledge.

The establishment of the Imperial

University of Peking in 1898 was the first of such reforms.

The Qing government

eventually decided to abolish the imperial examination (keju 科舉) in 1905, which put an
end to the traditional scholar-official (shidaifu 士大夫) system.

And since the imperial

examination had been the backbone of the traditional Chinese educational system for
more than a thousand years, the abolishment of it was an official announcement from the
government that the Chinese intellectual tradition would no longer be prioritized and
institutionally supported.

Without institutional support, the Chinese intellectual

tradition was soon marginalized and eventually became the subject of sinology (hanxue
漢學 or guoxue 國學)—a specialized area of study within the new disciplinary order of

Western knowledge—rather than a living tradition.

As prominent Chinese historian

Ying-Shih Yu (1991) points out, in the years between 1905 and 1911, the idea that
Western knowledge represents the universal truth was already deeply rooted in the mind
of Chinese intellectuals.
The second phase of the development of psychology in China started in this
period when Western knowledge became idealized as universal truth and institutionally
supported by the Qing government.

Since Japan was then regarded by Chinese

intellectuals as the successful Asian model of modernization, Japanese texts and systems
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quickly became the ―shortcut‖ for Chinese intellectuals to acquire Western knowledge
due to its use of the kanji (Chinese character) system.

In order to quickly train a new

generation of intellectuals who could serve as seeded teachers of Western knowledge, the
Qing government decided to set up teacher training institutes based on the Japanese
model in which psychological courses were offered as part of the curriculum.

As

Blowers (2006) and Kao (2009) point out, psychology at this time was strongly
influenced by Japanese psychology (whose major influence at the time was European
psychology) due to the extensive use of textbooks translated from Japanese.

In 1907,

Harold Høffding‘s Outline of Psychology was translated into Chinese by Wang Guowei
(1877-1927), a prominent scholar of both Chinese and Western knowledge in the early
20th century.

Wang was one of the early overseas students who went to Japan in pursuit

of modern Western knowledge, and it is likely that his translation of the term
―psychology‖ as xinlixue (heart-principles-study) was a direct adaptation of the Japanese
kanji translation.

Xinlixue, instead of the earlier translation xinlingxue (heart-spirit

study), later became the standard translation of the term ―psychology‖ in the Chinese
language.
The change of translation from xinlingxue to xinlixue was therefore a historical
event which involved more than a change in words: it marked the early
institutionalization of psychology in Chinese-speaking societies and the historical
transition of psychology‘s status from a complementary Western knowledge to a science
taken as universal truth.

In other words, it marked the birth of Western knowledge‘s

domination in the study of xin (heart).

As Liu (1995) reminds us, translation is a

translingual practice that is never natural or neutral.
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Translation is practical and

political.

It happens all the time due to practical purposes or needs, and consequentially

one always has to ask oneself ―in whose terms, for which linguistic constituency, and in
the name of what kinds of knowledge or intellectual authority does one perform acts of
translation between cultures?‖ (p. 1)

In the context of psychology, the hypothetical

equivalence between ―xin‖ and ―mind‖ was conventionalized, or in Liu‘s term ―thrown
together‖ (p. 12), under the historical condition in which Western knowledge became the
authoritative voice in determining the signification of the Chinese character xin.
other words, xin/mind became the super-sign.

In

As Liu (2004) explains,

What is a super-sign? Properly speaking, a super-sign is not a word but a
hetero-cultural signifying chain that crisscrosses the semantic fields of
two or more languages simultaneously and makes an impact on the
meaning of recognizable verbal units, whether they be indigenous words,
loanwords, or any other discrete verbal phenomena that linguists can
identify within particular languages or among them. The super-sign
emerges out of the interstices of existing languages across the abyss of
phonetic and ideographic differences. As a hetero-cultural signifying
chain, it always requires more than one linguistic system to complete the
process of signification for any given verbal phenomenon. The
super-sign can thus be figured as a manner of metonymical thinking that
induces, compels, and orders the migration and dispersion of prior signs
across different languages and different semiotic media. For that reason, it
offers ample insight into the workings of intellectual catachresis. (p. 13,
italics added)
Since xinlixue/psychology spoke the universal truth about xin/mind, the traditional study
of xin (heart) became, in Foucault‘s words, a form of ―naïve knowledge‖ which is
―located low down the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity‖
(Foucault, 1980b, p. 82).

And as a result, the introduction/translation of psychology

created a Chinese-speaking psychology that knows much about the mind but is quite
ignorant of xin (heart).
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The third phase of the development of psychology in China happened after the
establishment of the Republic of China in 1912.
Chinese psychology almost ceased to exist.

First, the Japanese influence on

As Blowers (2006) points out, Japanese

influence on Chinese psychology started to wane at the beginning of the 20th century, and
instead the United States became more influential in Chinese education through
establishing new universities (by Protestant missionaries) and providing financial aid to
encourage Chinese students to study in American.

However, the eventual cessation of

Japanese influence was a result of the Japanese Empire‘s growing ambition to occupy
Chinese territory.

The Western powers‘ decision to transfer the concessions of the

Shandong province from Germany to Japan in the Paris Peace Conference in 1919
sparked widespread student protests in China and anti-Japanese sentiment among the
general public.

Japan was no longer invested psychically by Chinese intellectuals as a

role model of modernization, but as an aggressive and ambitious enemy of the nation.
Second, the discipline of psychology became further institutionalized.

Starting

in the 1920s, more psychology departments were established in prestigious universities
such as Nanking Higher Normal College (1920), Peking Normal University (1920), the
National Peking University (1926), Qinghua University (1926),Yenching University
(1927), and Fujen University (1929).

Even though most of these newly established

psychology departments still emphasized education, as Blowers (2006) points out, with
the returning of more American-trained psychologists, gradually there was more
emphasis on the American model of empirical research and professional training.
Psychologists at this time were also actively involved in creating journals and popular
magazines.

These platforms served several functions.
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They were a forum for

psychologists to share their thoughts, an educational platform to popularize psychological
knowledge, and a portal to the new developments of psychology in the United States and
other nations.

As Blowers (2006) and Kao (2009) point out, Chinese psychology at this

time was clearly modeling itself on mainstream American psychology and gradually
shifting away from its early Japanese/European influence.
Third, the further institutionalization and professionalization of psychology
resulted in a more rigorous disciplinary boundary.

Gradually, only those who were

professionally trained in the discipline of psychology had a say about human psychology,
and those who did not have that training were disqualified from speaking.

As Zhong

(2008) points out, many eminent Chinese scholars such as Cai Yuanpei (1868-1940),
Liang Qichao (1873-1929), Wang Guowei (1977-1927), and Zhu Guangqian (1897-1986)
were originally quite interested in the development of psychology in China and they were
also active in the early years of psychology in China.

However, as psychology became

more institutionalized and professionalized, they gradually ceased to speak in psychology.
It was not that they stopped being interested in psychological affairs; rather, they became
keenly aware that they no longer had the ―right‖ to talk about psychology.

The

exclusion of nonprofessional psychologists did help early Chinese psychologists to form
a consensus group.

However, it became detrimental to the development of the young

science of Chinese psychology in the long run—Chinese psychology became fixated in
an essentially historical and cultural disciplinary boundary imposed by or modeled on
mainstream American psychology.

This disciplinary boundary became the ultimate

reference of what should be included in or excluded from the disciplinary practice of
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psychology.

The implied cultural and historical assumptions in this process were never

critically examined.
Last but not least, the psychological practice of Chinese psychologists at this time
had created a Chinese-speaking psychology in ―American terms,‖ so to speak.

As

Blowers and others (Blowers, 2006; Blowers, Tat Cheung, & Han, 2009) point out, there
were not many empirical studies done during this time, and Chinese psychologists were
mostly involved in the introduction of, or commenting on, Western psychologies of
which mainstream American psychology was a major part.

That is to say, Chinese

psychologists‘ discursive practice at the time mostly involved the translation of
psychological categories, theories, methods, and history of mainstream American
psychology into Chinese.

Consequentially, their collective efforts had created a

Chinese-speaking psychology which was essentially a system of super-signs utilized to
guide discursive and non-discursive psychological practices, and it had the authoritative
power to name local psychological phenomena in a way that corresponded to the
psychological categories or theories of mainstream American psychology.

Thus, the

relation between the discipline of Chinese psychology and the psychological life of the
local community was, and in many ways still is, radically different from the reflexive
relation between the discipline of psychology and the psychological life of the local
community in the Euro-American context (Richards, 1987). The significations of local
psychological phenomena were not articulated on the basis of the cultural-linguistic
matrix of the Chinese language (in the sense of metaphor) but metonymically imposed
from the hetero-cultural signifying chain of super-signs.

97

Thus the meaning and

structure of local psychological life always had to come from elsewhere, from the
camouflaged traces of super-signs.
The 1920s and the early 1930s were probably the golden years of Chinese
psychology.

Starting in 1937, China was drawn into a series of wars, first the war with

the Japanese Empire and later the Chinese Civil War.
in China was serious impeded by continuous wars.

The development of psychology

Research activities were mostly

forced to stop, and teaching and publishing were barely sustained.

The result of the

Chinese Civil War was the partition of China into two political entities—China and
Taiwan, respectively—in 1949, and the history of Chinese psychology split into three
different historical trajectories in China, Taiwan, and Hong-Kong.

From Sinicization to Indigenization
From a cultural-linguistic perspective, the development of psychology in Taiwan
after 1949 was in many ways a continuation of Chinese psychology.

It basically

followed the pattern of modeling mainstream American psychology (though with a much
stronger influence due to geopolitical factors), and Taiwanese psychologists continued to
create an inauthentic Chinese-speaking psychology based on the metonymic relation with
mainstream American psychology through the system of super-signs.

Nevertheless, the

relatively stable academic environment in Taiwan provided Taiwanese psychologists
with an opportunity to actually practice this psychology to the extent that the
inauthenticity of psychological practice started to become painfully undeniable for some
Taiwanese psychologists starting in the 1970s.

Their collective efforts to create a

psychology which is more relevant to or more ―compatible‖ (qihe 契合), in Kuo-Shu
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Yang‘s term, with the psychological life of the Taiwanese people was later called the
indigenous psychology movement (bentu xinlixue yundong 本土心理學運動) or the
indigenization movement of psychology (xinlixue bentuhua yundong 心理學本土化運動).
In the past few decades, the indigenous psychology movement has grown to be an
undeniable phenomenon in Taiwan.
as the ―father‖ of the movement.
movement in many ways.

Among Its advocates, Kuo-Shu Yang is often seen

Indeed, Yang has been the father figure of the

He has been the main theoretical architect of the movement;

he was the first to conceive of the necessity of a ―new psychology‖ and made it a
personal responsibility to promote it; he was also the mentor of several generations of
psychologists who later became the advocates of indigenous psychology; and his strong
will and determination to carry the movement forward had been the indispensible impetus
behind many crucial moments in the history of the movement.

That is to say, his

personal involvement and vision have greatly shaped the configuration of the movement
as we know it.

Yang‘s personal history and his account of the movement provide

important insights into the development of this approach.
Yang was born in Shandong Province, China in 1932, a year after the Mukden
Incident in which the Japanese Empire revealed its ambition to invade China.

His

childhood and teen years were mostly spent in the turbulence of war—first in the war
against Imperial Japan‘s invasion, and then in the Chinese Civil War between the
Kuomintang (KMT) and the Communist Party of China (CPC).

When he was 16,

Yang‘s family, along with a group of more than a million Chinese people, retreated to
Taiwan with Chiang Kai-Shek‘s KMT forces.21
21

KMT, with the advantage of its military

The Taiwanese population was about six million at the time. Therefore, the retreat of more than a
million Chinese people created much tension between the two polulations.
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forces, soon established an oppressive one-party regime in Taiwan under the leadership
of Chiang Kai-Shek.

Despite the fact that Mao Tse-Tung proclaimed the victory of

CPC and the founding of the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) in front of thousands in
October 1949, Chiang‘s KMT regime in Taiwan refused to admit KMT‘s failure nor
would they accept the demise of the Republic of China (ROC) that it helped found in
1912.

Chiang claimed that the retreat to Taiwan was only temporary, and that the KMT

forces would eventually strike back and reclaim ROC‘s sovereignty over mainland China.
The administration of the United States—ROC‘s former ally and strongest supporter in
World War II—was not happy about how the situation had turned out.

On the one hand,

the Truman administration blamed Chiang and the KMT for losing mainland China and
therefore refused to offer further support. On the other hand, however, the Truman
administration was also hesitant to recognize the legitimacy of China‘s new state because
of its communist regime.

Nevertheless, with the outbreak of the Korean War in June

1950 and the continuing unrest in Southeast Asia, the Cold War mentality quickly
became the dominant structuring force in the geopolitics of Asia.

The Truman

administration decided, albeit reluctantly, to provide financial assistance and military
support to Chiang and the KMT regime in Taiwan as part of the United States‘ Cold War
strategic deployment against the spread of communism in Eastern Asia.
With support from U.S. government, Chiang‘s KMT regime in Taiwan declared
that the ROC had not disappeared but was instead in a state of crisis owing to the
unfinished Chinese Civil War.
through military action.

Chiang‘s plan to end the civil war was to ―retake China‖

Nonetheless, he needed time to re-equip his military forces as

well as to persuade the United States to join the action, without which his ambition would
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not have a chance to succeed.

Taiwan, in this grand plan, played a crucial role.

could never become a ―normal‖ society.

It

Instead, it had to remain like a military base, or

the ―springboard to retake China,‖ as the KMT phrased it.

The KMT government

therefore declared that the martial law instituted in May 1949 would be indefinitely
extended for the sake of national security.

However, military coercion was not enough

for the KMT to claim rightful sovereignty of the ROC over all of China, nor was it
enough to establish the legitimacy of its regime in Taiwan.
The ROC on Taiwan needed a reasonably convincing narrative to tell its citizens
and the international community; in comparison to the PRC, the ROC on Taiwan
presented itself as a republic worthy of defense. The Cold War ideological rhetoric of the
―free vs. communist‖ binary was therefore used to draw the line: the ROC on Taiwan was
the ―Free China,‖ and the PRC was the ―Communist China‖ or ―Red China‖.

And in

this grand scheme of the battle between the ―freedom camp‖ and the ―communist camp,‖
Taiwan was seen as two things at once.

Militarily it was seen as the ―unsinkable aircraft

carrier‖ with which to retake mainland China, and politically it was portrayed as the ideal
democratic Chinese society, a ―lighthouse of liberty‖ for all Chinese people.

Just as the

two inherently conflicting metaphors imply, the self-proclaimed ―democratic‖ state of the
ROC under Chiang‘s KMT regime was no more than an authoritarian military state in
which thousands of innocent lives were lost and human rights were greatly violated.
With critical voices suppressed and political dissidents jailed or killed, Chiang‘s KMT
regime undoubtedly created a ―stable‖ society in which limited democracy and some
reforms were implemented.

In any case, it was good enough for many people to live an
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ordinary life, especially for those retreated ―mainlanders‖ (waishengren 外省人) who had
drifted for years and thus yearned for a life undisturbed by war.
The yearning for a peaceful life also seemed to be reflected in Yang‘s original
choice of an academic major.

According to what he later revealed in a public talk, his

―romantic imagination‖ of the poetic life in the mountains was one of the main reasons he
chose to be a forestry major (Center for Teaching and Learning Development at the
National Taiwan University, 2008).

However, his dream of living quietly in the

mountains was soon disrupted, not by the eruption of a war but by an illness.

He was

diagnosed with tuberculosis and was forced to take a leave of absence for a year from
National Taiwan University (NTU) in his sophomore year.

This sudden period of spare

time, as Yang (1999a) later recalls, was a life-changing period. Due to the nature of the
disease, Yang was advised to stay indoors and avoid unnecessary social contact.
took the chance to read voraciously, especially in the humanities.

He

The readings inspired

him to reconsider what he wanted to do with his life if he recovered from the disease.
The secluded life of living and working in the mountains now seemed too escapist and
too individualistic a dream when his fellow people were still suffering from the unrest
and disorganization resulting from the weakness of their nation.

Like many people who

preceded him, Yang was inspired to take up the social responsibility of an intellectual.
Yang identified with prior intellectuals‘ passion to save Chinese people from their
miseries by ways of reform.

However, he figured that since, for decades, a variety of

reforms had already been implemented without much success, a fundamental reform had
to happen on the human level for the institutional changes to really work.

After a year

of thinking, Yang returned from his leave of absence determined to change his majors.
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The choice of a major had become for him the choice of a lifelong career, something not
only to make a living at but at the same time to take up the social responsibility of an
intellectual.

Yang decided to change his major to psychology because psychology, as

Yang figured, was the study of the human heart (renxin 人心), which is at the core of the
human (ren 人) issues he wanted to tackle.

At the time, the Department of Psychology

at NTU was the only psychology department in Taiwan, and the general public did not
really have a good sense of what psychology was about.

In their naive imagination,

psychology was somehow a discipline more suitable for women than for men.

Yang‘s

decision to be a psychology major was therefore a peculiar one, unsupported by most
people around him (Yang, 1997).
With the clarity of hindsight Yang (1999a) admitted that his decision to become a
psychology major was also based more or less on a naive belief in what psychology
should be rather than on a well-informed understanding of what psychology actually is.
Nonetheless, ―not knowing‖ somehow became the driving force for Yang in his early
days of learning psychology.

Yang called this period an ―exploratory‖ stage in which

he explored the territory of psychology by teaching undergraduate courses and doing
research based on the findings of American mainstream psychologists.

In those years,

Yang gradually changed his research interests from the formation and cure of
experimental neurosis in animals, to behavioral learning in rats, monkeys and children,
and eventually to the study of Chinese personality and social behavior due to the
awakening of his ―humanistic inclination‖ (Yang, 1997, p. 63).

It was not until after

more than a decade of learning, teaching, and doing research that Yang finally felt
confident that he had a good grasp of psychology.
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This included receiving three years

of what he considered to be ―the best training in scientific psychology available anywhere
in the whole world‖ from eminent psychologists in the Department of Psychology at the
University of Illinois (Yang, 1997, p. 63).

He was confident as a psychologist and

became academically productive in the following years (roughly from 1969 to 1974)
doing what he thought he was supposed to do—researching Chinese subjects.
To his own surprise, starting in 1974 , after nearly 15 years of teaching and
researching as a psychologist, he found himself gradually losing his appetite for doing
psychological research and felt that his work ―did not have enough relevance or make
much sense‖ regarding the study of Chinese psychological life (Yang, 1997, p. 64). To
his dismay, the profession he had dedicated himself to whole-heartedly had somehow
betrayed him.

After much soul searching, he realized that the cause of his

disillusionment was that he, as well as his psychology colleagues, was reproducing a
―highly Westernized psychology‖ by
uncritically [accepting] the concepts defined, [adopting] the theories
developed, and [utilizing] methods (and tools) invented by American
psychologists, without seriously caring whether or not those concepts,
theories, and methods were sufficiently compatible with the studied local
phenomena and their social-cultural contexts. (p. 64)
He therefore concluded that a ―new psychology‖ that would ―make much more sense not
only to Chinese psychologists but also to Chinese people at large‖ was needed (p. 65).
Therefore, Yang‘s dream of a genuinely indigenous Chinese (huaren 華人)
psychology began as an outcome of his temporary disillusionment with practicing
psychology as a lifelong career.

After realizing the cause of his disillusionment, Yang

was again impassioned in his profession as a psychologist.

In his own words,

I convinced myself that it was my responsibility to let my fellow Chinese
psychologists know that they had been doing research in a rather fruitless
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way. I considered it my lifelong mission to promote and help create a
better psychology in Chinese societies, which would make better sense to
Chinese people and be more applicable in explaining and predicting their
psychological and behavioral functioning. (Yang, 1997, p. 66)
Yang‘s rationale was that since he and his colleagues were doing ―highly Westernized‖
psychological research, the reasonable step to rectify the status quo was to Sinicize
(zhongguohua 中國化) psychological research. And through collective efforts to Sinicize
psychological research, a ―new‖ and more ―compatible‖ psychology would be created.
Nonetheless, he was not confident that his idea to Sinicize psychological research would
be welcomed by his colleagues in the Department of Psychology at NTU who were still
strong believers in the American tradition of experimental psychology in which the
universality of psychology was never challenged.

He therefore decided to push the idea

in a ―roundabout‖ way by first convincing his anthropology and sociology colleagues in
the Institute of Ethnology at Academia Sinica of which he was a research fellow.

Two

of his prestigious colleagues in the Institute, Yih-Yuen Li (anthropologist) and Chung-I
Wen (sociologist), supported his idea that an academic movement of Sinicization should
be promoted.
Yang then moved temporarily to Hong Kong for a year to help establish the
Department of Psychology at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) in 1978.
During his time there, he took the opportunity to promote his idea of Sinicization by
organizing a discussion group with his social sciences colleagues at the CUHK.

The

notion of Sinicizing research in the social sciences was fervently discussed and the group
members concurred with Yang on the necessity of an academic movement of Sinicization
in Chinese societies.

With support from both his colleagues at the CUHK and in the

Institute of Ethnology at Academia Sinica, Yang finally organized an interdisciplinary
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conference entitled ―The Sinicization of Social and Behavioral Science Research in
Chinese Societies,‖ which was held at Academia Sinica at Taipei in 1980.

The success

of the conference and the ensuing publication of an anthology in 1982 successfully
publicized the notion of Sinicization in the community of social sciences in Taiwan and
other Chinese societies.22
In his article written for the conference, Yang (1982) proposes for the first time
how to Sinicize psychological research.

He summarizes four guiding directions:

1. empirically retesting the significant research findings obtained by foreign
psychologists (p. 158);
2. empirically studying important psychological phenomena that are unique among
Chinese people (p. 163);
3. revising foreign-origin theories and constructing new theories that are especially
compatible with Chinese behavior (p. 169); and
4. improving foreign-origin research methods (and tools) and developing new
methods (and tools) that are especially applicable to the study of Chinese people (p.
176)
These guidelines do not seem to come from any particular theoretical position but rather
from Yang‘s personal experience in his attempt to Sinicize psychological research.
Yang suggested that his fellow Taiwan psychologists follow these guidelines so as to
gradually stop being dependent on, or in Yang‘s words stop ―being breastfed‖ (duannai
斷奶) by, Western psychology.

These four guidelines became the first set of guiding

principles (rather than rigorously imposed rules) for Taiwanese psychologists to Sinicize
their psychological research during the 1980s.
Taiwanese historian Daiwie Fu (1993) interprets this Sincization discourse as ―a
local strategy of the dominant academic group in Taiwan‘s social sciences for advancing

22

Chinese social scientists were also deeply interested in the notion of Sinicization, but they were unable
to participate in the 1980 conference because of antagonistic China-Taiwan relations. As a result, a more
China-based conference entitled ―Modernization and Chinese Culture‖ was held at the CUHK in 1983 in
which the notion of Sinicization was discussed in the broader context of Chinese modernization.
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their own intellectual interests within the local sociohistorical contexts of the early
eighties‖ and its adaptation of a universal language (for example, ―academic dependence‖
or ―center vs. periphery‖) was ―at least partly to take advantage of the popular
atmosphere of local color movement23 [or the Taiwan localization movement]…in order
to defend their own intellectual position and to upgrade their academic machinery‖ (p.
257).

He further argues that the ―partial success‖ of the Sinicization discourse was due

to ―the ‗replacement‘ or ‗transference‘‖ of position and role which used to be occupied by
the more radical advocates of the Taiwanese localization movement arrested in the
Meilidao Incident (美麗島事件)24 in 1979.
I can only ―partially‖ agree with Fu‘s interpretation, and believe that the
Sinicization discourse should be understood within the larger sociohistorical context.
There were two major events—namely, the United Nations‘ recognition of the PRC as
the only legitimate representative of China in 1971, and the United States‘ decision to
diplomatically recognize the PRC in 1978—which significantly threatened the legitimacy
of the KMT government.

Also called into question were the two indoctrinated but

dearly held ideological beliefs of the Taiwanese people: first, that the ROC is the
legitimate representative of China, and second, that the United States is the strongest ally
23

Taiwanese historians often trace back the publicization of the local color movement (or the Taiwan
localization movement) to a heated public debate concerning xiangtu wenxue (literature of local color or
indigenous literature) that happened between 1977 and 1978. It was originally a literary debate among
writers but it quickly became a public debate about issues related to the critiques of modernization,
colonization, and American imperialism, which at the time were still taboo topics in the authoritarian
regime of the KMT.
24
Formosa Magazine (meilidao zazhi 美麗島雜誌) was a magazine created in 1979 by political dissidents
which functioned as a platform to voice their political ideas and also as an institutional base to organize
oppositional forces. On December 10, 1997, the magazine‘s Kaohsiung service center held a Human
Rights Day celebration without the permission of the KMT government, and it evolved into a serious
conflict with the police and the army which was later called the Meilidao Incident (美麗島事件). The
incident later became the KMT government‘s excuse to persecute political dissidents. The massive arrest
was a serious setback to the democratic movement. Many local political elites were arrested and jailed.
However, it was also an awakening experience for many young people, and many of them later became the
new generation of political dissidents.
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of the ROC.

These two ideological beliefs were the cornerstones of the KMT

government‘s propaganda, and they were also essential to the Taiwanese people‘s
collective identity, both culturally and politically.

On the one hand, the Taiwanese

people felt deeply betrayed and demanded a continued friendship from the United States,
which was partially offered by enacting the Taiwan Relations Act passed by the United
States Congress in 1979.

As a result, the idealized image of the United States was

temporarily shattered but was soon mended, at least politically.

However, culturally,

some educated Taiwanese, especially the postwar generation, began to rebel against the
overwhelming influence of American popular culture in which they grew up.25

On the

other hand, more and more Taiwanese people became disillusioned with the ROC‘s
rightful representation of China which gradually evolved into a political crisis for the
KMT government and an identity crisis for the Taiwanese people.
Culturally, the Taiwanese people became bewildered about who they really were.
Some decided to seek their roots (xungen 尋根) beyond the KMT‘s propaganda, and
some became doubtful of their Chinese identity and started to advocate for a Taiwanese
identity.

―Searching for one‘s identity‖ was therefore a major theme in the overall

cultural scene at the time.26

Politically, the Taiwanese people also became less tolerant

of the KMT government‘s ideological propaganda, its civil war mentality, and eventually
its authoritarian regime to contain the supposed ―crisis‖ that resulted from the Chinese

25

For example, in the 1970s, the ―sing our own songs‖ slogan advocated by the Campus Folksong
Movement (xiaoyuan minge yundong 校園民歌運動) was greatly echoed among the young Taiwanese.
26
For example, the master piece Legacy (xinchuan 薪傳) of the now world-renown Cloud Gate Dance
Theatre of Taiwan (yunmen wuji 雲門舞集) was first performed the night when the United States
government announced that it would diplomatically recognize the PRC in December 1978. Legacy‘s
beautiful portrait of Taiwanese ancestors‘ early migration from the coastal area of China to Taiwan and the
eventual settlement through collaborative hard work greatly reverberated in the Taiwanese society of the
time.
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Civil War.

They started to challenge the KMT government and demanded a more

democratic state. They also became more actively involved in public affairs, such as
environmental protection issues or labor issues, which for years were rigorously
monitored and controlled by the KMT government.

The eruption of all these once

suppressed social powers was later called the Taiwan localization movement.
Initially, the KMT government tried to contain these forces by arresting dissidents
and tightening political control, which resulted in stronger opposing forces.

The KMT

government eventually decided to legitimate its rightful regime by sharing power with
local political elites.

The KMT government also realized that the crumbling political

ideology was no longer sufficient to legitimate its regime and therefore created a new one
during the 1980s by emphasizing the ―miraculous‖ economic accomplishments
supposedly resulting from the brilliant leadership of the KMT government.

This new

ideology of economic growth was later shared by the KMT‘s opposing party, the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

In July 1987, the martial law instituted in May

1949 was lifted by Chiang Ching-Kuo, Chiang Kai-Shek‘s son and political heir, and
Taiwanese society started to go through a series of dramatic changes.

Coming out of the

political coercion of the KMT government, most Taiwanese people were happy to
embrace an economic-centered ideology which seemed to guarantee a better life.

With

the end of the Cold War in 1991, the Taiwanese government quickly embraced the
post-coldwar ideology of neoliberalism strongly advocated by the United States and thus
Taiwan became more ingrained in the capitalistic world order dominated by the United
States. Taiwanese society as a whole became more Americanized in the past two
decades rather than the other way around.
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As Fu (1993) points out, in this sociohistorical context, Sinicization discourse was
indeed a continuation of the Taiwanese social sciences‘ previous interdisciplinary
research agenda to construct ―Chinese personality.‖ And there is no doubt that,
strategically speaking, the ―Sinicization vs. Westernization‖ binary was trying to ―play it
safe‖ (by making psychological research more Chinese) in a political environment in
which proclaiming Chinese-ness was still an imposed ideology.

In this sense,

Sinicization discourse was indeed a defensive strategy, but it was not an attempt by some
academic elites to ―advance their own intellectual interests.‖ Rather, it was an effort to
ensure that an academic movement in the social sciences could proceed without risking
being politically suppressed at a time when the KMT government felt seriously
threatened by opposing forces.

The massive arrests of the Meilidao Incident occured

less than a year ago before the Sinicization conference took place, and in the authoritarian
regime of the KMT government, any micro-politics in the name of ―movement‖ or
―revolution‖ would be closely examined.
time even in the academic world.

Freedom of speech was not guaranteed at the

And in terms of its historical effects, Sinicization

discourse proved to be productive and emancipative rather than oppressive, as Fu‘s (1993)
interpretation might suggest.
Different academic communities in Taiwan reacted differently to Sinicization
discourse.

It evoked the most discussion in the sociology community, especially in the

community of Taiwanese sociologists living in the United States; it was only slightly
echoed in the anthropology community, and the psychology community did not respond
to the notion as strongly as expected (Yang, 1993). However, during his short visit to
Harvard University in 1988, Yang was shocked by a question and became keenly aware
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of how urgent it was that the movement continue to develop.

This is how Yang (1997)

describes his ―Harvard experience‖:
In the discussion session after my presentation, the well-known
developmental psychologist Jerome Kagan asked me the question: What
kind of psychology would have been developed by Chinese psychologists
if there had not been any Western psychology? I was shocked by his
question and, after a moment of silence, I managed to reply that Chinese
psychologists would have developed some kind of collectivistic-oriented
psychology without the hegemonic influence of Western or American
psychology. To be honest, I found myself, then and later, dissatisfied
with my answer. I must admit that Kagan's question gave me a chance to
look more closely and squarely at the naked reality that little was left in
Westernized Chinese psychology after those elements that had been
borrowed from, or influenced by, Western psychology were taken away.
Moreover, through my exchange of ideas with the seminar participants, I
began to realize that North American psychology, the most developed in
the world, was an endogenous kind of indigenous psychology…in the
sense that its major concepts, theories, methods, and findings have
originally and spontaneously evolved partly from the European intellectual
traditions but mostly from the cultural and social-philosophical matrix of
the American society. (p. 69)
After coming back from his visit to the United States, Yang became more active
in mobilizing the movement.

He invited psychologists as well as scholars from other

disciplines to meet and discuss on a regular basis; he organized a series of conferences
which took place every 2-3 years, he edited and published anthologies of major
conference papers; he founded a Chinese Journal in 1993 so as to create a regular
publication outlet for indigenous psychological research; and he helped to establish a
foundation in 1997 to provide organizational support for indigenous psychological
research.

Meanwhile, in the late 1980s, Yang and his colleagues decided to use a

different term, ―indigenization,‖ to replace ―Sinicization‖ in labeling their efforts.
(1997) says that there were two reasons for this change.

First, the term ―Sinicization‖

seems to suggest a kind of Sinocentralism; and second, after decades of separation,
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Yang

Taiwan, China, and Hong-Kong had become three uniquely different societies in which
people displayed different psychological characteristics despite the fact that they, to a
great extent, shared a common cultural-linguistic matrix.

However, from a discursive

perspective, the change of labeling was also a reaction to changes in Taiwanese society.
For most Taiwanese people, the continuous progression of the Taiwan localization
movement from the 1980s to the 1990s had created a drastic change with regard to
collective identity.

They were less psychically invested in the old Chinese identity and

became more psychically invested in the new Taiwanese identity.

It became clearer for

most people that Taiwan did not represent ―free China.‖ Instead, ―China‖ became the
Other nation across the Taiwan Strait which represented not only a national threat but at
the same time a land of economic opportunity.
an appealing label for the movement.

As a result, ―Sinicization‖ was no longer

In fact, the ―Chinese‖ connotation of the term

would be a barrier for some interested Taiwanese psychologists to take part in the
movement.
More importantly, the change in labeling also reflected a change in discourse.
As Yang (1997) points out, during the Sinicization phase of the movement, his attempt to
Sinicize psychological research did not aim to establish a ―Chinese psychology‖ or to
develop an ―indigenous psychology‖ because at the time he still insisted that there was
only one scientific psychology and that ―it was not legitimate to talk about indigenous
psychology within that psychology‖ (p. 68).
view.

Yang‘s ―Harvard experience‖ changed his

He was shocked by the fact that after nearly a decade of Sinicizing psychological

research, he could not even imagine a Chinese psychology that was not influenced by the
ideas of Western psychology.

And he also realized that the ―one scientific psychology‖
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he insisted on was actually mainstream American psychology which in essence was an
indigenous psychology rather than a universal psychology.

Therefore, Yang (1993)

proposed that the indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan should strive to indigenize
already Westernized psychology so as to establish an ―indigenous Chinese psychology‖
(huaren bentu xinlixue 華人本土心理學) which is ―indigenously compatible‖ with the
psychological life of the Taiwanese people.

And through the collective efforts of

establishing indigenous psychologies around the world, a genuine global psychology,
rather than the pseudo-universal psychology proclaimed by Western psychology, could
eventually be established.
In order to discern the changes involved in conceptualizing the movement from
the Sinicization discourse to the indigenization discourse, Yang‘s indigenization
discourse has to be carefully unpacked.

First, the universal character of the ―one

scientific psychology‖ represented by mainstream American psychology in the
Sinicization phase was given up due to Yang‘s realization of the ―indigenous‖ character
of mainstream American psychology.

A genuine universal psychology therefore

became a psychology in the future tense, and it had to be accomplished by the collective
efforts of indigenous psychologies around the world.

Yang personally never gave up

the idea that psychology should be a ―science‖ but he decided to prioritize the notion of
―indigenous compatibility‖ (bentu qihexing
the indigenization discourse.

本土契合性) over the ―scientific‖ demand in

Consequentially, psychologists interested in more

―qualitative‖ kinds of psychology such as phenomenological psychology or narrative
psychology were more willing to identify with or take part in the indigenous psychology
movement.

Nevertheless, a group of critical-minded psychologists still considered the
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indigenization discourse too ―conservative‖ and decided to part ways with the movement
despite their original interest in the movement in the early 1990s. 27
Second, Yang‘s conceptual distinction between three psychologies—namely,
indigenous psychology, Westernized psychology, and indigenized psychology—and the
relations between them to a great extent reflects his conceptualization of how the
indigenous psychology movement in non-Western societies should proceed.
English paper, Yang (2006) further explicates the three psychologies.

In his 2006

He says,

[I]ndigenous psychology [is] a discipline that applies the scientific method
to the study of psychological and behavioral phenomena of people in a
specific ethnic or cultural group, in such a way that the theories, concepts,
methods, and tools used are highly compatible not only with the studied
phenomena, but also with their ecological, economic, social, cultural, and
historical contexts. (p. 299)
Yang emphasizes that for a psychology to be qualified as an ―indigenous psychology,‖ it
has to be ―spontaneously, naturally, and gradually formed through an endogenous process
without the intrusion and domination of a powerful alien scientific psychology‖ (p. 299).
Therefore, only ―psychologies in the Euro-American countries and the former Soviet
Union are genuinely indigenous‖ (p. 299).

Yang considers psychologies currently

practiced in most non-Western societies to be ―Westernized psychologies,‖ which in
essence are a kind of ―artificially transplanted psychology‖ (p. 299) initiated and
developed under the hegemonic domination of Western indigenous psychologies.

27

They

These critical-minded psychologists were mostly from the psychology department at the Fu Jen Catholic
University (輔仁大學) which was overall not genealogically connected to the Department of Psychology at
NTU. They were more radical in theoretical orientation and were more actively involved in social
movements. Therefore, in a community dominated by NTU alumni and psychologists trained in the
tradition of mainstream American psychology, who mostly believed that psychology should be an objective
and empirical science, their existence was in many ways marginalized in the Taiwanese psychology
community. However, their continuous effort in practicing an alternative psychology has gradually been
recognized in recent years. And their journal base Research in Applied Psychology has become a platform
of interesting debates which is radically different from that in Indigenous Psychological Research in
Chinese Societies, the journal base of the indigenous psychology movement.
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were formed ―by a process of academic Westernization through which non-Western
psychologists uncritically adopt Western theories, concepts, methods, and tools in their
research with local people as participants‖ (p. 299).

Yang acknowledges that

psychologists in non-Western societies did attempt to modify the concepts, theories,
methods, and tools of Western indigenous psychologies in local terms.

However, he

considers the modifications to be ―superficial,‖ which at best created a variation of
Westernized psychology.
Yang defines ―indigenized psychology‖ as the aim of the movement which would
be accomplished by gradually transforming Westernized psychology through a process he
calls ―quasi-endogenous indigenization‖—that is, non-Western psychologists‘ efforts to
consciously and purposely indigenize their research in such a way that the
theories, concepts, methods, and tools created and used are sufficiently
compatible with the studied local psychological and behavioral
phenomena as structurally and functionally embedded in their ecological,
economic, social, cultural and historical contexts. (pp. 299-300)
Yang (1993, 1999b) expands the four guidelines he proposed in the 1982 paper into a list
of practical guidelines consisting of ten ―Dos‖ and seven ―Don‘ts‖ in indigenizing
psychological research (or the process of quasi-endogenous indigenization),28 and his

28

Yang‘s ten ―Dos‖ consists of: (1) do tolerate ambiguous states and suspend decisions as long as possible
in dealing with conceptual, theoretical, and methodological problems until something indigenous emerges
in the phenomenological field; (2) do be a typical Chinese person when functioning as a researcher, and let
Chinese ideas, values, and ways of thinking be fully reflected in the research process; (3) do take the
studied psychological or behavioral phenomenon and its social, cultural, and historical context into careful
consideration whenever conceptualizing the phenomenon and designing the study; (4) do consider the
details of the studied phenomenon and its context before applying a Western concept, theory, method, or
tool; (5) do give priority to the study of culturally unique psychological and behavioral phenomena or
characteristics of Chinese people; (6) do begin research with a thorough immersion in the natural concrete
details of the studied phenomenon and its original context; (7) do study not only the specific content of a
behavioral phenomenon but also the specific psychological mechanism or process behind or underlying the
behavior; (8) do base research on the Chinese intellectual tradition rather than the Western intellectual
tradition; (9) do study not only traditional aspects of Chinese psychological functioning, but also the
modern ones and the characteristic traditional modern combinations formed under the impact of societal
modernization; and (10) do investigate the psychological functioning of the ancient Chinese and its
relationship to the functioning of contemporary Chinese people. And his seven Don‘ts consists of: (I)
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notion of ―indigenous compatibility‖ is at the conceptual core of these practical
guidelines.

In his most recent article, Yang (2012) continues to emphasize that the

notion of ―indigenous compatibility‖ should be the guiding principle of indigenous
psychological research so as to facilitate the ―condition of congruity‖ between
psychological research and the studied phenomenon (p. 15).

In his words,

indigenous psychological research [should] be conducted in such a way
that the researcher‘s theory, concepts, methods, tools, and findings
sufficiently reflect, represent, and reveal the natural structure and process
of the studied local psychological or behavioral phenomenon as embedded
in the sociocultural context. (p. 15)
Yang‘s dream of a ―new psychology‖ eventually took shape in the indigenization
discourse.

It was initially a kind of asceticism in conducting research activities in the

Sinicization discourse, and in the indigenization discourse it became a positive proposal
of an agenda to indigenize Westernized psychology through indigenizing psychological
research.

The ―how‖ of indigenizing psychological research was still in the form of

practical guidelines expanded from the guidelines to Sinicize psychological research.
However, these guidelines were now based on a clearly formulated notion of ―indigenous
compatibility‖ so as to facilitate the condition of congruity between psychological
research and the studied phenomenon.

Decolonization through Indigenization?

don't uncritically adopt Western psychological concepts, theories, methods, and tools; (2) don't overlook
Western psychologists' important relevant experiences in developing their own indigenous psychologies; (3)
don't reject useful indigenous concepts, theories, methods, and tools developed by other Chinese
psychologists; (4) don't adopt any cross-cultural research strategy with a Western-dominant imposed etic or
pseudo-etic approach; (5) don't use concepts, variables, or units of analysis that are too broad or abstract; (6)
don't
consider research problems in terms of English or other foreign languages; and (7) don't politicize research.
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The indigenous psychology movement was echoed by many Taiwanese
psychologists in the 1990s, especially among NTU alumni since the indigenous
psychology movement was very much a NTU-based academic movement.

Through the

collective efforts of the advocates of the movement, such as publishing papers and books,
holding conferences and seminars, and engaging in dialogues with foreign psychologists
as well as scholars from other disciplines, the indigenous psychology movement in
Taiwan was beginning to be recognized as a significant phenomenon in psychology
starting in the late 1990s, both domestically (for example, Chiu, 2004) and internationally
(for example, Allwood & Berry, 2006b; Hwang, 1998).

However, despite the seeming

success of the movement, the indigenous psychology movement also started to show
some signs of worrisome development started from the 2000s.
The indigenization discourse gradually lost its charm in inspiring the new
generation of psychologists.

From a critical historical perspective, the indigenous

psychology movement was never a purely academic movement; it was also part of the
various social movements resulting from the collective identity crisis that started in the
1970s.

As I pointed out above, the Taiwanese localization movement involved

disillusionment with the political ideology of the KMT government, and it resulted in the
gradual separation of Taiwanese identity from Chinese identity.

Similarly, the

indigenous psychology movement involved temporary disillusionment with the idealized
image of the United States.

However, unlike political relations with the United States

which soon mended, in the academic context temporary disillusionment became the
window of opportunity for Taiwanese social scientists to be confronted with the
dependency of their academic practice, and the Sinicization movement was their reaction
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to rectify the condition of dependency.

In terms of discourse, the condition of

dependency was conceptualized as a ―Westernized‖ condition which was to be rectified
by Sinicizing psychological research—that is, the individual psychologist‘s ascetic effort
to refrain from uncritically utilizing predigested Western psychological knowledge.

The

change of discourse from Sinicization to indigenization in the 1990s did not really change
the conceptualization of how the Westernized condition should be rectified; the
indigenization discourse continued to rely on the individual psychologist‘s ascetic effort
to indigenize psychological research.

The major change involved in the indigenization

discourse was that it proposed a new psychology—that is, an indigenously compatible
psychology—as the desired object.

However, with the democratic overthrow of the

authoritarian regime of the KMT government in the 2000 presidential election and the
following eight years of governance by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a
Taiwanese-led opposition party, terms such as ―localization‖ and ―indigenization‖
gradually lost their charm in inspiring movements since what these terms refer to were
seen as accomplished rather than as goals worth fighting for.

For the new generation of

psychologists, the new ―magic‖ terms in the post-coldwar Taiwan dominated by
neoliberal ideology became ―globalization‖ and ―internationalization‖ rather than
―indigenization‖ and ―localization.‖

And as K.-H. Chen and Chien (2004) point out,

terms such as ―internationalization‖ or ―globalization‖ to a great extent equal
―Americanization‖ in the Taiwanese context (pp. 185-186).
As the indigenization discourse gradually lost its charm, its conceptual weakness
in advancing the indigenous psychology movement started to become clear.

As I tried

to point out above, the Sinicization discourse was proposed during the time when the
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idealized image of the United States was temporarily shattered and thus the
overwhelming influence of mainstream American psychology was revealed to
psychologists as a problematic dependency on ―Western‖ psychology.

As a result, the

―Chinese vs. Western‖ binary was used in the Sinicization discourse to deal with the
―relevancy‖ issue of psychological research.

Psychological research in Taiwan became

irrelevant to the psychological life of the Taiwanese people because of its dependency on
Western psychology and therefore it had to be Sinicized.

However, in the indigenization

discourse, this ―Chinese vs. Western‖ binary was further expanded to a ―Chinese
psychology vs. Western psychology‖ binary in which Chinese psychology became the
aim in the agenda of the indigenous psychology movement.

The agenda proposed by

the indigenization discourse was essentially an anticolonial agenda which attempted to
break free from dependence on Western psychology (Westernized psychology) by a
collective effort to instate a Chinese psychology (indigenized psychology).
In Yang‘s distinction of the three psychologies, the ideal psychology was
indigenous psychology which was ―spontaneously, naturally, and gradually formed‖ in a
genuine indigenization process.
its ―pure form‖ (p. 7).

And according to Yang (2012), this was psychology in

However, this ideal psychology—that is, the one hundred percent

indigenously compatible psychology—was an opportunity lost for non-Western societies
since the psychologies in these societies were already a kind of Westernized psychology
initiated and developed under the domination of a powerful Western psychology.

The

only choice left for non-Western psychologies was to pseudo-indigenize the already
Westernized psychology by the ascetic efforts of psychologists so as to facilitate the
―indigenous compatibility‖—a notion derived from the ideal psychology represented by
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indigenous Western psychology—of their research.

Therefore, this anticolonial agenda

did not really break free from the dependence on Western psychology.

On the contrary,

it was still entangled in its identification with the idealized image of Western psychology
by instating an inverse ideal image of anOther psychology whose parameters are
implicitly determined by the idealized image of Western psychology.
As I have shown in the previous two sections, psychology was introduced to the
Chinese-speaking world in a colonial situation in which the West as a whole was
idealized.

This idealized West was represented by Europe before World War II, but in

the postwar era it became represented by the United States.

In the colonial situation,

Western knowledge was introduced as a superior form of knowledge, and psychology
was included even though its superiority was to a great extent presumed rather than
proven.

The further institutionalization and professionalization of psychology

suppressed and marginalized traditional psychological practice (the study of xin) and
created a Chinese-speaking psychology which in essence is a system of super-signs used
to guide discursive and nondiscursive psychological practices, and whose authority
comes from the metonymic relation with mainstream American psychology through the
system of super-signs.

Therefore, the practice of psychology in Chinese-speaking

societies, Taiwan included, became an inauthentic practice in which the meaning and
structure of the local psychological life were metonymically imposed rather than locally
articulated.

Therefore, psychology‘s journey to the East was essentially a colonization

of psychic space in which the ―soul‖ (xin) grounded in the cultural-linguistic matrix of
the Chinese language was no longer allowed to give voice to itself in psychology.
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Furthermore, this inauthentic practice of psychology had an effect on the
psychologists.

They became problematic subjects in their practice of psychology.

As

Yang and Wen (1982) describe,
The subjects whom we studied are Chinese people in Chinese society, but
the theories and methods we used are mostly imported from the West or of
the Western style. In our daily life, we are Chinese; when we are doing
research, we become Western people. We repress our Chinese thoughts or
philosophy intentionally or unintentionally, and make them unable to be
expressed in our procedure of research. (as cited in Hwang, 2005a, p. 230,
italics added)
As long as the authority of the idealized West held sway, this inauthentic practice of
psychology and the split of subjectivity would not be seen as problematic. However, as I
pointed out above, the idealized image of the United States was temporarily shattered in
the 1970s, and as a result the inauthentic practice was seen as problematic.

The

indigenous psychology movement emerged in this window of opportunity.

Both

Sinicization discourse and indigenization discourse conceptualized the colonial situation
of psychology with an anticolonial language which was once inspiring in the 1980s and
1990s when the language of oppositional politics was also used by other social
movements in fighting against the authoritarian regime of the KMT government.
Nevertheless, this anticolonial discourse gradually became less inspiring and started to
show its conceptual limitation in effectively problematizing the colonial situation of
psychology in Taiwan.
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Chapter 5
Remembering the Dream: Toward a Postcolonial Critique
The indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan started as one man‘s dream and
eventually emerged as a collective effort of psychologists to find a way out of the
overwhelming influence of mainstream American psychology so that the ―soul‖ (xin)
could be restored to the practice of psychology.

However, both the Sinicization and

indigenization discourses failed to provide an effective strategy for breaking free from
dependence on Western psychology.

On the contrary, the movement became

unknowingly entrapped in the problematic imaginary relation with mainstream American
psychology.
What most indigenous psychologists did not realize is that the call for an
indigenous psychology actually emerged out of a traumatic encounter between two
worlds in a colonial context, and colonial trauma is not something that can be simply
wished away, ignored, or bypassed.

As Kuan-Hsing Chen (1998), a prominent

Taiwanese scholar in the field of cultural studies, keenly points out, ―we are still
operating within the boundary of colonial history, which has generated a whole set of…
colonial cultural imaginary in which all of us are caught up‖ (p. 2, italics added).
Therefore, to face colonial trauma involves more than setting indigenous psychological
research guidelines—the ―Dos‖ and ―Don‘ts‖ suggested by Kuo-Shu Yang in his
manifesto-like Why Do We Need to Develop an Indigenous Chinese Psychology? (1993).
It also involves more than enriching the epistemological and methodological complexity
of indigenous psychology as suggested by Kwang-Kuo Huang (2005b), one of the most
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assiduous and prolific indigenous psychologists in Taiwan.

It is even more than using

the hermeneutic phenomenological approach as a ―cultural redemption‖ of the
already-Westernized psychology, as suggested by Der-Heuy Yee (1997), the pioneer of
hermeneutic phenomenological psychology in Taiwan.

What they failed to notice is the

depth (in relation to subjectivity) and pervasiveness (in relation to discourse) of this
colonial trauma and how, on the imaginary level, it has shaped the historical trajectory of
the indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan.

At the center of this pathological

searching for recognition, as I have demonstrated in chapter 3 and chapter 4, is a
problematic colonial subject whose desire is determined by the inverse idea/ideal of the
West.

Ashis Nandy describes this inversion in his postcolonial masterpiece The Intimate

Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism (1983) as ―the second form of
colonization‖:
This colonialism colonizes minds in addition to bodies and it releases
forces within the colonized societies to alter their cultural priorities once
for all. In the process, it helps generalize the concept of the modern West
from a geographical and temporal entity to a psychological category.
The West is now everywhere, within the West and outside; in structures
and in minds. (p. xi)
The consequence of this inversion, this colonial trauma, is what I call the problematic
colonial subject.

It is problematic because, unlike the inversion that helps to shape the

egoic gestalt as discussed in Lacan‘s conception of the mirror stage (Lacan, 2006), the
second form of colonialism fragments and transgresses a colonized people‘s egoic gestalt,
as Fanon (1952/1967), Nandy (1983), and Bhabha (1994) have pointed out.

The desire

of this subject is, therefore, as problematic as the subject himself or herself; it is
inevitably a hybrid of desires in which the desire to be Western (or to be non-Western) is
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at the core of the economy of desire, as Fanon (1965), Memmi (1957/1991), and Nandy
(1983) have pointed out.
In an academic environment which is even more Americanized than it was in the
1970s, is there really a way out of the seemingly totalizing influence of mainstream
American psychology? It seems to me that Foucault‘s idea of ―criticism‖ is a strategy
worth considering, and to a great extent it helped to lay the foundation for the
postcolonial critique provided by this project.

Foucault‘s (1980b) notion of ―criticism‖

refers to a form of local theoretical offensive which is ―an autonomous, non-centralized
kind of theoretical production, one that is to say whose validity is not dependent on the
approval of the established regime of thought‖ (p. 81).

In another text, Foucault (1997)

further explicates the operation of criticism as follows:
Criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal
structures with universal value but, rather, as a historical investigation into
the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize
ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying. In that
sense, this criticism is not transcendental…it is genealogical in its design
and archaeological in its method. Archaeological…in the sense that
it…will seek to treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we
think, say, and do as so many historical events. And this critique will be
genealogical in the sense that…it will separate out, from the contingency
that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or
thinking what we are do, or think. It is…seeking to give new impetus, as
far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom. (p. 315)
In other words, criticism is a form of theoretical production that utilizes archaeology to
historically eventualize ―instances of discourse‖ so that the established regime of
knowledge can be discerned as a result of historical contingency rather than as ―natural‖
or as ―inevitable.‖ And as Foucault points out, this criticism proceeds by means of ―a
return of knowledge‖ or ―an insurrection of subjugated knowledges‖ (Foucault, 1980b, p.
81).

By ―subjugated knowledges‖ Foucault means two things.
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First, it refers to ―the

historical contents that have been buried and disguised in a functionalist coherence or
formal systemization‖ (p. 81), and as Foucault points out, ―only the historical contents
allow us to rediscover the ruptural effects of conflict and struggle that the order imposed
by functionalist or systematizing thought is designed to mask‖ (p. 82); and second, it
refers to ―a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their
task or insufficiently elaborated: naïve knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy,
beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity‖ (p. 82).
Similarly, what I have presented in this dissertation is a postcolonial critique
which does not instate anOther competing system of knowledge but attempts to provide a
―way out‖ of the established regime of mainstream American psychology.

The strategy

of this postcolonial critique is to destabilize the seemingly totalizing power of
mainstream American psychology by way of re-membering critical historiographies with
regard to its construction Others, the presumed universality of its history, its metonymic
practice in the Chinese-speaking world, and Taiwanese psychologists‘ struggle with it on
the imaginary level so as to reveal the power-knowledge-desire relations therein.

What

this project offers is a strategy to decolonize psychic space so as to open up the
possibility for psychology in Taiwan to be practiced in an authentic manner—that is, as a
reflexive social practice in relation to the psychological life of its local community—and
so that the ―soul‖ (xin) grounded in the cultural-linguistic matrix of the Chinese language
can finally be allowed to emerge in the practice of psychology rather than be suppressed
by the system of super-signs maintained by the problematic relation with idealized
mainstream American psychology.
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In sum, I consider this project to be part of the historical struggle of the
indigenous psychology movement.

What I have tried to do is to turn a critical gaze back

upon the movement itself in order to decolonize it from the colonial cultural imaginary.
This is a crucial step in decolonizing the psychic space of the colonized. Without it, even
the most well-intended indigenous psychologist will keep falling back into the ―vicious
circle of colonization, decolonization, and recolonization,‖ as Chen (1998, p. 2) has
warned.
This project has been a historical project in which the aim is to remember the
history of the indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan.
used in two senses.

The term ―remember‖ is

The first sense is quite straightforward. I have written a history of

the indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan because, in general, the history of
psychology in Taiwan is rarely told.

To the best of my knowledge, after all these years,

there is only one book chapter by Hsu (1987) about the history of psychology in Taiwan;
one journal article by Chiu (2004) about the history of social psychology in Taiwan; and
one journal article by Hwang (2005a) about the emergence of Chinese indigenous
psychology in Taiwan.

It is as if there were a consensus among Taiwanese

psychologists that psychology does not need a history in Taiwan; it is as if the
magnificent, innovative, and dramatic events all happen at the center—in Europe or in
the United States of America.

This very fact of lacking a historical consciousness is in

fact a symptom of colonization which is addressed in Chapter 3.
This brings me to the second sense of the term ―remember.‖

Writing about the

indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan has been a way of re-membering the
historical trajectory of psychology in Taiwan.
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Through looking into historical

documents, formulating temporary hypotheses, and finding ways to organize the bits and
pieces into a historical narrative, the historical trajectory of psychology in Taiwan
eventually becomes clear.

The history I have written is, therefore, not a history about

progress; it is not about how psychology has helped to improve the lives of the
Taiwanese people.

Instead, it is a genealogical history in a Foucauldian sense.

This project has been an archaeological project which involves an analysis of the
indigenous psychology movement on the discursive level.

Since the analysis of

discourse involves more than knowledge, it is no longer satisfactory to remain on the
methodological level with regard to the discussion of indigenous psychology as most
indigenous psychologists have done.

That is to say, the recognition/misrecognition of

indigenous psychology involves more than epistemology, more than philosophy, more
than ontology; in other words, it is not only a knowledge issue but also a power issue.
As I have argued, the pathology of recognition is characteristic of a colonial and
oppressive culture; in this case, unfortunately, the pathology has been demonstrated to
exist within the discipline of psychology.

In order to bring both power and knowledge

into my analysis, I followed the lineage of discourse analysis originally developed by
Foucault in the Archaeology of Knowledge (1971/1972) and in Discipline and Punish
(1975/1977), and by Said in Orientalism (1979), and by Bhabha in The Location of
Culture (1994).

The analysis of the ―power-knowledge-desire relations‖ in which the

discipline of psychology is embedded is laid out as part of a theoretical discussion in
chapter 2, for it constitutes the horizon in which the indigenous psychology movement
has emerged.
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This portion of the theoretical work consisted of two parts.

The first involved an

analysis of the historical development of the discourse of ―Others‖ that takes place at the
center of psychology—that is, in mainstream American psychology.

My argument has

been that, in the post-World War II era, psychology has not only become part of the
―psychosciences and disciplines‖ that help to shape the postwar Euro-American subjects
(Rose, 1990, 1996); it has also played a constitutive role in shaping the postwar
non-Euro-American subjects.

I traced the historical formulation of the discourse of

―Others‖ within psychology from the racial Other to the cultural Other.

In the historical

process of discursively positioning Others, ―culture‖ is a new signifier of difference in
place of ―race.‖ The so-called ―culture-related‖ psychologies that have gradually
developed in the past couple of decades can be seen as the ―surfaces of emergence‖ in
which the representation of the cultural Other takes shape.

The second part of the

theoretical work involved an analysis of the historical development of the discourse of
―the idealized West‖ that takes place at the margins of psychology.

In this project,

however, I limited myself to analyzing one case that I am most familiar with—
psychology in the Chinese speaking world, especially in Taiwan.
Finally, this project has been a psychoanalytic project.29
being psychoanalytic is on the theoretical level.

The first sense of it

Even though psychoanalysis achieved

its original success in and from the therapy room, it has never been bounded by it.
Psychoanalysis has always been used as a theoretical resource for social criticism; in fact,
29

There is no doubt that psychoanalytic theory can be used either to oppress (for example, to pathologize
homosexuality) or to provide rationales for oppression (for example, Mannoni (1956) rationalized
oppression as a necessary dependence of the colonized). On the other hand, psychoanalytic theory can
also be a powerful theoretical apparatus against oppression as many post-colonial writers have
demonstrated. It seems to me that psychoanalytic theory becomes oppressive when it functions as a
totalizing theory; when it functions as a criticism—findings holes in a whole, so to speak—it becomes a
powerful weapon against a totalizing system.
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Freud himself can be regarded as the founder of psychoanalytic social criticism.

Later

in his life, Freud wrote two influential essays The Future of an Illusion (1927) and
Civilization and Its Discontents (1930) critical of the pathologies of religion and
civilization.

In the context of colonialism, Octave Mannoni‘s Prospero and Caliban:

The psychology of Colonization (1956) and Frantz Fanon‘s Black Skin, White Masks
(1952/1967) are two pioneer works concerning how the colonial situation creates its
subjects—both the colonizer and the colonized.

Other works have since advanced this

discussion: Albert Memmi‘s The Colonizer and the Colonized (1957/1991), Ashis
Nandy‘s The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism (1983),
Homi Bhabha‘s The Location of Culture (1994), and Kelly Oliver‘s The Colonization of
Psychic Space: A Psychoanalytic Social Theory of Oppression (2004).

Oliver‘s (2004)

project to transform psychoanalytic concepts into social concepts by ―developing a
psychoanalytic theory based on a notion of the individual or psyche that is thoroughly
social‖ (p. xiii) seems especially relevant to the colonial context in which the individual
developmental schema of subjectivity has been greatly challenged.

As Oliver says,

If the psyche does not exist apart from social relationships and cultural
influences, a social psychoanalytic theory is necessary not only to
diagnose social phenomena but also to explain individual subject
formation. We cannot explain the development of individuality or
subjectivity apart from its social context. (pp. xiii-xiv)
I take Lacan‘s linguistic formulation of Freud‘s psychoanalytic theory as a powerful
theoretical apparatus for social criticism.
Lacanian concepts in their works.

Many postcolonial authors have been using

The re-conceptualization of psychoanalytic theory

into a social theory as suggested by Oliver has been an interesting direction to take after
the Lacanian reformulation, and I consider this project to be part of this theoretical
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endeavor.

Many of Lacan‘s concepts (for example, his conceptions of the mirror stage,

misrecognition, the structure of perversion, the notion of disavowal, the imaginary, the
symbolic, etc.) have been the building blocks of this project on the psychoanalytic level.
The second sense of this as a psychoanalytic project is on the level of intervention.
Psychoanalysis has always been about intervention, about inducing transformation in the
subject in order to relieve him or her from suffering.

This project of remembering the

indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan is, to a great extent, analogue to the
remembering process Lacan mentions in Freud’s Papers on Technique, 1953-1954
(1991). There Lacan suggests that ―the restitution of the subject‘s wholeness appears in
the guise of a restoration of the past‖ (p. 14).

As he says,

One could say that [what] Freud touches [on] there…[is] the fact that
[what] the subject relives, comes to remember, in the intuitive sense of the
words, the formative events of his existence, is not in itself so very
important. What matters is what he reconstructs of it….I would
say—when all is said and done, it is less a matter of remembering than of
rewriting history. (pp. 13-14)
As I have argued above, modern colonialism transgresses and fragments the egoic gestalt
of the colonized.

As a result, the colonized does not have a history unless it is related to

the history of the colonizer; through the inversion of the idealized West, the traditional
history of the colonized has become a scandal, a necessary negation in order to idealize
the West.

Writing history is therefore an effort to put the unspeakable—colonial

trauma—into words. It is by writing about the history of this dream of one man—the
dream for a genuinely indigenous psychology—that we, Taiwanese psychologists, will
eventually be relieved from the cultural aphasia resulting from the traumatic encounter
between two worlds and regain the ability to listen to our own heart (xin), giving voice to
our own dreams.
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